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EVERYBODY WANTS TO GO TO HEAVEN, BUT
NOBODY WANTS TO DIE:
THE STORY OF THE TRANSATLANTIC COMMON AVIATION
AREA*
Stephen D. Rynerson"°
The Transatlantic Common Aviation Area (TCAA, also known as the
Common Transatlantic Aviation Area, CTAA, or simply the Common Aviation
Area, CAA)' is a revolutionary idea in the field of international aviation, seeking to
move beyond the framework that has dominated the industry for over half a
century.2 Yet despite the significance of the TCAA in the realm of international
transportation law, it has been virtually ignored by the American legal
community. 3  The purpose of this article is to bring this important new
*Editor's Note: On February 8, 2003, shortly before this issue was sent to the publisher, the U.S.
Department of Defense activated the passenger aircraft component of Stage I of the Civil Reserve Air
Fleet (CRAF) for the second time in the program's history. See DOD Activates Commercial Airlift
Reserves for Troops, REGULATORY INTELLIGENCE DATA, Feb. 10, 2003. This consisted of forty-seven
aircraft, or approximately five percent of the CRAF's total capacity under current enrollment in the
program. See Defense Dept. Activates First Stage of Civil Reserve Fleet, AVIATION DAILY, Feb. 11,
2003, at 3. The author would like to state that this event does not materially affect the portion of his
article concerning the U.S. military's objections to the Transatlantic Common Aviation Area.
** Juris Doctor expected May 2003, University of Denver College of Law. B.S. Economics and B.A.
History, Regis University, 1997. The author would like to thank Dr. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Director
of the Institute of Air & Space Law, McGill University, for his encouragement and advice on this
project.
1. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Competition in the Air: European Union Regulation of Commercial
Aviation, 66 JAir L. & Com. 979, 1076 (2001) [hereinafter.Competition in the Air]. "TCAA" appears
to have become the preferred abbreviation. See Vice President of the European Commission and
Commissioner for Transport and Energy Loyola de Palacio, Beyond Open Skies, Address to Aviation in
the 21st Century, Beyond Open Skies Conference (Dec. 6, 1999) (transcript available at
http://www.eurunion.org/news/speeches/1999/991206dp.htm) (using the term "TCAA" exclusively)
[hereinafter Beyond Open Skies].
2. See Beyond Open Skies, supra note 1.
3. Only five law review articles provide any discussion of the subject under any of its names.
See Paul V. Misfud et al., International Legal Developments in Review: 1999 Public International Law,
Aviation andAerospace Law, 34 INT'L LAW. 625, 631-34 (2000); Competition in the Air, supra note 1,
at 1076-78; Eli A. Friedman, Comment, Airline Antitrust: Getting Past the Oligopoly Problem, 9 U.
MIAMI Bus. L. REv. 121, 136-37 (2001); Ulrich Schulte-Strathaus, Common Aviation Areas: The Next
Step Toward International Air Liberalization, 16 Air & Space Law. 4 (2001); Yu-Chun Chang &
George Williams, Prospects for Changing Airline Ownership Rules, 67 J. AIR L. & COM. 233 (2002).
One law review article discusses the prospects of a "Free Fly Zone" which would be similar to the
TCAA. See G. Porter Elliot, Antitrust at 35,000 Feet: The Extraterritorial Application of United States
and European Community Competition Law in the Air Transport Sector, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. &
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
development the recognition it merits. Part I will explain the history of the
TCAA's development, from the Convention on International Civil Aviation of
1944 (Chicago Convention) through the European Court of Justice's 2002 decision
on the ability of E.U. Member States to set their own aviation policies. Part II will
examine what the TCAA might look like if it came to fruition. Finally, Part III
will identify obstacles to the establishment of the TCAA.
PART I: THE PAST IS PROLOGUE
The Bilateral Regime in 15 Minutes or Less4
The legal structure of modem international aviation was established by the
Chicago Convention of 1944.5  Created for the purpose of establishing a
multilateral framework for "openness, trade, and mutual co-operation," the
Chicago Convention instead gave rise to a system largely based on individual
national interests, 6 embodied in treaties, executive agreements, and other
documents collectively referred to as bilateral air services agreements, 7 bilateral air
transport agreements, 8 or, just simply, "bilaterals." 9 The conventional wisdom is
that the United States intended to push for a "laissez-faire, free market philosophy"
in international aviation as part of the Chicago Convention.10 However, it could be
argued that the path to restrictive bilaterals was set down from the very beginning,
ECON. 185, 227-31 (1997). Another article analyzes the E.U. Commission's claims in its suit against
the Member States over their bilateral air service agreements (see discussion infra), but does not
directly discuss the TCAA. See John Balfour, A Question of Competence: The Battle for Control of
European Aviation Agreements with the United States, 16 AIR & SPACE LAW. 7 (2001). The American
Bar Association has only mentioned the TCAA twice in its official publications, both times merely in
passing. See American Bar Association, Section of Public Utility, Communications and Transportation
Law, Report of the Aviation Committee, Spring 2000, at 5, at http://www.zsrlaw.coml
publications/articles/PDF/FJC0006.pdf; American Bar Association, Air and Space Law Forum Special
Committee on Cross-Border Investment and Right of Establishment in the International Airline
Industry, Cross-border Investment in International Airlines: Presenting the Issues, Oct. 19, 2000, at
http://www.abanet.org/formns/alrspace/prelimreport.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2002) [hereinafter Cross-
border Investment].
4. Numerous books and articles have been written which discuss the development of the bilateral
regime in the wake of the Chicago Convention. See, e.g., PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, LAW AND FOREIGN
POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL AvIATION 7-76 (1987) [hereinafter LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY]; Ruwantissa
I.R. Abeyratne, Would Competition in Commercial Aviation Ever Fit Into the World Trade
Organization?, 61 J. AIR L. & COM. 793 (1996); Romina Polley, Aviation Defense Strategies of
National Carriers, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 170 (2000); Friedman, supra note 3. The author's purpose
here is to briefly summarize the development for readers not otherwise familiar with the legacy of the
Chicago Convention.
5. See Polley, supra note 4, at 170-71.
6. See Beyond Open Skies, supra note 1.
7. See Abeyratne, supra note 4, at 794.
8. See Seth M. Warner, Comment, Liberalize Open Skies: Foreign Investment and Cabotage
Restrictions Keep Noncitizens in Second Class, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 277, 285 (1993).
9. See Competition in the Air, supra note 1, at 1070.
10. Warner, supra note 8, at 283. See also Adam L. Schless, Open Skies: Loosening the
Protectionist Grip on International CivilAviation, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 435, 438 (1994).
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when in his opening statement the U.S. representative to the International Civil
Aviation Conference, where the Chicago Convention was drafted," analogized
international aviation to railroading, 12 which was already being crippled
domestically by heavy regulation at the time of the conference.13
Regardless of whether the possibilities of a liberal multilateral regime were
defeated before drafting even began, the structure of the Chicago Convention
shows it clearly was not designed to easily facilitate such a system, as several
articles in the final document gave national governments broad powers to regulate
international air traffic that crossed their borders. 14 Yet the Chicago Convention
did not compel the formation of bilateral agreements, either. 15 The reasons for the
historical dominance of bilateral agreements are open to debate, but most
commentators suggest that this resulted from a combination of security concerns,16
a desire to ensure that benefits resulting from governmental negotiations would be
reaped primarily by the negotiating states, 17 and/or a desire to protect existing
national airlines. 8  Ultimately, the conjunction of the Chicago Convention
framework and national interests gave rise to a situation where "the mission of
every country with an airline capable and desirous of handling transnational
11. See Troy A. Rolf, Comment, International Aircraft Noise Certification, 65 J. AiR LAW &
COM. 383, 387 (2000).
12. See 1 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION
CONFERENCE, NOVEMBER I - DECEMBER 7, 1944 57 (1948).
13. See CLARENCE B. CARSON, THROTTLING THE RAILROADS 78-83 (1971). Aside from this
telling reference, the U.S. had prepared drafts for the Chicago Convention that would have limited
carrier capacity and also sought cabotage restrictions that would have had the effect of limiting foreign
access to the U.S. domestic air market. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Turbulence in the "Open Skies":
The Deregulation of International Air Transport, 15 TRANsP. L.J. 305, 311 n.12 (1987) [hereinafter
Turbulence]. "Cabotage" is generally defined as "trade or transport in coastal waters or airspace or
between two points within a country." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 194 (1991). In air
transport it is defined as "the transportation of passengers, cargo, or mail by a foreign airline between
two points in the same nation-the foreign carriage of domestic traffic." Paul Stephen Dempsey, The
Disintegration of the U.S. Airline Industry, 20 TRANSP. L.J. 9, 29 (1991) [hereinafter Disintegration].
14. See, e.g., Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, arts. 1, 6, 7, 17, 18, 61
Stat 1180, 1182, 1185, available at http://www.iasl.mcgill.ca/airlaw/public/chicago1944a.pdf (last
visited July 8, 2002) [hereinafter Chicago Convention]. Article 1: "The contracting States recognize
that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory." Article 6:
"No scheduled international air service may be operated over or into the territory of a contracting State,
except with the special permission or other authorization of that State, and in accordance with the terms
of such permission or authorization." Article 7: "Each contracting State shall have the right to refuse
permission to the aircraft of other contracting states to take on in its territory passenger, mail and cargo
carried for remuneration or hire and destined for another point within its territory. Each contracting
State undertakes not to enter into any arrangements which specifically grant any such privilege on an
exclusive basis to any other State or an airline from any other State, and not to obtain any such
exclusive privilege from any other State." Article 17: "Aircraft have the nationality of the State in
which they are registered." Article 18: "An aircraft cannot be validly registered in more than one State,
but its registration may be changed from one State to another."
15. See Chris Thornton & Chris Lyle, Freedom's Paths, AIRLINE Bus., Mar. 2000, at 74
[hereinafter Freedom's Paths].
16. See, e.g., Polley, supra note 4, at 193.
17. See, e.g., id
18. See, e.g., Elliot, supra note 3, at 209-10.
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services [was] to facilitate its airlines access to foreign markets, while
simultaneously protecting its own market from an influx of foreign carriers."' 9
Only a few traces of multilateralism emerged from the International Civil
Aviation Conference.2 0  The first was the creation of the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) by the Chicago Convention itself.2' The ICAO was
tasked with developing the "principles and techniques" of international air
transportation,2 but it was also obligated to do such things as "[p]revent economic
waste caused by unreasonable competition" and to make sure "every contracting
State has a fair opportunity to operate international airlines., 23  Two side-
agreements did more to promote a nascent multilateral framework, however, and
began the process of establishing the spectrum of aviation freedoms known
today.2 4  Of the fifty-two states that signed the Chicago Convention, thirty-two
signed the "Two Freedoms Agreement," 25 while a further twenty signed the "Five
Freedoms Agreement, ' ,26 which together came to define the basic premises of
modern international aviation.2 7 Yet only the "Two Freedoms Agreement"
attained the required number of signatories to enter into force, thus obligating
nations to separately negotiate agreements to gain additional international traffic
rights.28
19. See, e.g., Elliot, supra note 3, at 186 (footnotes omitted).
20. See Abeyratne, supra note 4, at 800-02.
21. Chicago Convention, art. 43, at 1192.
22. See id., art. 44, at 1192.
23. See id, art. 44(e), (f), at 1193.
24. See Abeyratne, supra note 4, at 801-02. There are now eight generally recognized freedoms.
They are as follows:
First Freedom: The right to overfly a territory.
Second Freedom: The right to land in another country for a non-commercial purpose (e.g., refueling).
Third Freedom: The right to load passengers, cargo and mail in the carrier's country of origin and
unload them in another country (e.g., a U.S. carrier loads passengers in New York and unloads them in
London).
Fourth Freedom: The right to load passengers, cargo and mail in another country and bring them back
to the country of origin (e.g., a U.S. carrier loads passengers in London and unloads them in New
York).
Fifth Freedom: The right to load passengers, cargo and mail in one country and then fly to another
country (e.g., a U.S. carrier flying from New York to Helsinki stops in Paris and loads passengers
bound for Helsinki).
Sixth Freedom: The right to load passengers, cargo and mail in another country and unload them in a
third, after a stopover in the country of origin (e.g., on a flight from London to Paris to Rome, a French
carrier loads passengers in London bound for Rome).
Seventh Freedom: The right to carry passengers, cargo or mail between two countries on a stand-alone
service, where the flight does not go via the carrier's country of origin (e.g., a German carrier operates a
route from London to Madrid).
Eighth Freedom: Cabotage, the right to carry passengers, cargo or mail within the borders of another
country (e.g., a Greek carrier operates a route from Copenhagen to Torshavn, Faeroe Islands).
Adapted from European Union Commission, Air Transport, The Eight Freedoms of Air Traffic, at
http://www.europa.eu.int/comni/transport/themes/air/english/at_3_en.html (last visited Dec. 31, 2001).
25. International Air Services Transit Agreement, Dec. 7, 1944, 59 Stat. 1693, 84 U.N.T.S. 389.
26. International Air Transport Agreement, Dec. 7, 1944, 59 Stat. 1701, 171 U.N.T.S. 387.
27. See Abeyratne, supra note 4, at 801-02.
28. See id. at 802; F. Allen Bliss, Rethinking Restrictions on Cabotage, 17 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L
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Soon after the Chicago Convention, the United States and the United
Kingdom entered into the first major bilateral in what was commonly termed the
Bermuda Agreement.29  The Bermuda Agreement represented a compromise
between U.S. and British interests.30 The key elements of the Bermuda Agreement
were its relatively liberal capacity restrictions 31 and its elaborate rate restrictions
that relied on the International Air Transport Association (IATA) 32 to impartially
establish fares. 3 3 Liberal Fifth Freedom rights were also granted to both parties.
34
The Bermuda Agreement (later known as Bermuda I) became the rough model for
most other bilaterals for over three decades.35 The late 1970s, however, saw the
first major cracks appear in the bilateral regime.36
Following a dispute about whether the United States was abusing Bermuda I's
loose capacity limits by authorizing too many carriers on U.S.-U.K. routes,37 the
United States and United Kingdom entered into the Bermuda II Agreement
(Bermuda II) in 1977.3 ' Bermuda II was significantly more restrictive than its
predecessor:39 limiting the number of carriers that could serve routes between the
two nations, 40 giving the parties' respective governments considerable control over
capacity,4' and noticeably diminishing U.S. Fifth Freedom rights beyond the U.K.
market.42
L. REv. 382, 388-89 (1994).
29. Air Services Agreement, Feb. 11, 1946, U.S.-U.K., 60 Stat. 1499 [hereinafter Bermuda I]. It
is often now called the Bermuda I Agreement to distinguish it from the Bermuda II Agreement of 1977
(Agreement Concerning Air Services, July 23, 1977, U.S.-U.K., 28 U.S.T. 5367, 1977 U.S.T. LEXIS
351 [hereinafter Bermuda II]).
30. See Elliot, supra note 3, at 210.
31. Bermuda I did not establish any numeric targets for capacity, but instead required that "the air
transport facilities available.., should bear a close relationship to the requirements of the public for
such transport," and that the parties provide "a fair and equal opportunity" for their respective carriers
to operate on any routes permitted by the agreement. Bermuda I, supra note 29, at 1515.
32. IATA was, and is, the worldwide trade group for air carriers. It was established in April 1945,
with an initial membership of 57 carriers. IATA, About Us, History, at http://www.iata.org/history.htm
(last visited Jan. 19, 2002).
33. See Bermuda I, Annex II, at 1504-06. The parties could block fares they considered
unreasonable. Id. at Annex II (e), (f), at 1505. IATA was permitted, under antitrust immunity granted
by the U.S. government, to establish fares for U.S.-based international aviation. See Turbulence, supra
note 13, at 347-48.
34. See Bermuda 1, Annex IV (a), (b), at 1510.
35. See Turbulence, supra note 13, at 316
36. See id. at 325. It should be noted that some commentators argue the bilateral regime was
doomed by the 1960s, when charter operations and a proliferation of airlines in the developing world
undermined IATA's rate-making authority. See Josd A. Gomez-lbanez & Ivor P. Morgan,
Deregulating International Markets: The Examples ofAviation and Ocean Shipping, 2 YALE J. ON REG.
107, 111-12 (1984).
37. See Angela Edwards, Note & Comment, Foreign Investment in the US. Airline Industry:
Friend or Foe?, 9 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 595, 601-02 (1995).
38. See Bermuda II, supra note 29.
39. See Edwards, supra note 37, at 601-02.
40. See Bermuda II, art. 3, 1977 U.S.T. LEXIS 351, at 7-12.
41. See id. at art. I I and Annex 2, 1977 U.S.T. LEXIS at 23-27, 70-76.
42. Compare Bermuda 1, Annex Ill, at 1507-10 with Bermuda II, Annex 1, 1977 U.S.T. LEXIS at
52-70.
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Following the disappointment of Bermuda II, the United States launched an
aggressive campaign to liberalize international aviation, for the purpose of both
improving the market choices for consumers and to punish the United Kingdom by
dealing more directly with other European nations.43 The United States succeeded
in completing eleven new bilaterals between 1978 and 1980 with nations including
Belgium, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, and
Finland," which particularly resulted in gains for Belgian and Dutch carriers to the
detriment of U.K. carriers.45 Although the sheer number of bilaterals completed in
so short a span was impressive in and of itself, of more significance was that these
46bilaterals were qualitatively different than the earlier Bermuda I-type. Popularly
called "Open Skies" agreements, these bilaterals:
1. Permitted flexible pricing;
2. Banned capacity restrictions;
3. Permitted multiple designations, i.e., different carriers operating the
same route;
4. Gave access to secondary U.S. markets, e.g., Atlanta, Dallas, etc.;
5. Granted new Fifth Freedom rights for U.S. carriers;
6. Allowed charter operations under the rules of the charter's country of
origin; and
7. Banned discriminatory and unfair methods of competition.
47
The final blow against the bilateral regime came in 1978 when the United
States menaced IATA with removal of its antitrust protection.48 While the
threatened action was never carried out,49 IATA was sufficiently intimidated that
in 1979 it divided itself into a two-tiered structure: a trade association, to which all
member carriers belong, and a voluntary tariff coordinating body.50 Today,
somewhat less than forty percent of IATA's members participate in tariff
coordination.5 ' Yet at what seemed to be its moment of triumph, the United States
turned away from the aggressive path of liberalization,52 although some suggested
that this was because there were no more victories to be won from reticence.53 The
43. See Turbulence, supra note 13, at 333-35.
44. See Edwards, supra note 37, at 605.
45. See Turbulence, supra note 13, at 334-36, 336 n.101.
46. See id. at 334-36, 338-39.
47. Seeid. at 338-39 nn. 108-11, 113.
48. See id. at 349-51.
49. See id. at 353-54.
50. See IATA, About Us, History, at http://www.iata.org/history3.htm (last visited Jan. 19,2002).
51. Compare id (noting "some 100" carriers engage in tariff coordination) with IATA,
Membership, at http://www.iata.org/membership (noting 272 members) (last visited Jan. 19, 2002).
52. See Turbulence, supra note 13, at 382.
53. A U.S. negotiator told Aviation Week & Space Technology that there were "very few new
routes to trade, so the negotiations tend to be focused on details of carrying out agreements .... We
can't just create a new Chicago-Zurich route." James K. Gordon, U.S. Negotiators Face Complex
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legacy of this liberalization drive, however, lived on as U.S. deregulation increased
the competitive pressure on trans-Atlantic routes, prompting the European nations
to begin examining intra-European liberalization more closely.
54
As American liberalization efforts were tapering off, northern European
governments began to lead a gradual shift away from bilaterals calculated to
protect national air carriers from open competition toward a system more closely
resembling the U.S. Open Skies bilaterals of 1978-80.55 The United Kingdom and
the Netherlands formed the vanguard of this movement, believing that consumers
and air carriers alike would benefit from a more laissez-faire market. 6 In June
1984, the United Kingdom completed a new bilateral with the Netherlands that
allowed carriers to serve any route between the two countries, set their own
capacities, frequencies, and schedules, and set fares subject only to disapproval by
the country of origin.57 Hailed as a "bilateral revolution," the U.K.-Netherlands
bilateral was accompanied by predictions that it "could have a domino effect.
58
This prognostication was proven partially correct when the United Kingdom
developed other, more limited, bilaterals soon thereafter with the Federal Republic
of Germany, France, Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland.59
In the spring of 1985, the United Kingdom completed a new bilateral with
Luxembourg, which liberalized route access, capacity controls and fare approval
procedures. 60 The agreement provided for unrestricted market entry and capacity,
while fares could ordinarily be rejected only by the agreement of both
governments, 61 although the country of origin could unilaterally reject a fare it
found predatory or excessive.62 This agreement became the United Kingdom's
desired model for subsequent bilaterals.63
Not all parties were happy with the United Kingdom's bilateral-mania, with
such aviation noteworthies as Lufthansa's deputy general manager for international
relations arguing the U.K.-Netherlands bilateral and others were harming separate
deregulation efforts by the European Economic Community. 64 British Airways'
general manager for pricing, while conceding that bilaterals were likely to persist,
Schedule of Bilateral Talks, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Feb. 11, 1985, at 43.
54. See Liberal Regulatory Environment Alters 1ATA's Fare Setting Role, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., Nov. 11, 1985, at 102.
55. See id.
56. See Michael Feazel, European Civil Aviation Leaders Commit to Increased Liberalization,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., June 24, 1985, at 36.
57. See Michael Feazel, British Dutch Aim at Deregulation, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., June
25, 1984, at29.
58. Id.
59. See New Agreements Spur European Liberalization, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 12,
1984, at 71 [hereinafter New Agreements].
60. See STEPHEN WHEATCROFT & GEOFFREY LiPMAN, AIR TRANSPORT IN A COMPETrIVE EUROPEAN
MARKET: PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS, AND STRATEGIES 213 (1986).
61. See David A. Brown, Britain Urges Deregulation Effort in 1986, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,
Dec. 2, 1985, at 36.
62. See WHEATCROFT & LIPMAN, supra note 60, at 213.
63. See Brown, supra note 61.
64. See New Agreements, supra note 59.
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suggested, "The EEC is a benchmark. It forces people to think about these issues
and keep them in the public attention., 65 However, other airline officials argued
the advancements in bilaterals reduced the need for the European Economic
Community to involve itself in the matter.66
Despite the United Kingdom's initiatives, many carriers declined to lower
rates. 67 Furthermore, like the United States before it, the United Kingdom began to
find that it was running out of nations that were interested in entering into new
bilaterals.68 By the late 1980s, the prospects for additional liberal bilaterals in
Europe appeared bleak. 69  However, those that had been completed offered a
glimpse of what services might result if a liberal multilateral agreement was
reached.70
If It's Tuesday, This Must be Brussels
By 1993, the Member States of the European Community (or Community) 71
had entered into roughly 800 separate bilaterals.72 January 1 of that year had seen
the implementation of the "Third Package" of aviation reforms by the European
Community, which largely replaced the bilaterals between the Member States,
making it possible for citizens or governments of Member States to establish
carriers anywhere in the European Community and fly between Community
airports under one set of regulations.73 Eager to parlay this new internal unity into
external leverage, the E.C. Commission (Commission) 74 began a campaign to take
65. See New Agreements, supra note 59.
66. See id
67. See LAw AND FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 4, at 103.
68. See WHEATCROFT & LIPMAN, supra note 60, at 68-69.
69. See LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 4, at 103-04.
70. See, e.g., Airline Observer, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 17, 1986, at 33 (noting that two
years after the U.K.-Netherlands bilateral was introduced the Amsterdam-London city-pair had become
Europe's most heavily trafficked route with 210 flights weekly by seven scheduled carriers).
71. The Member States at that time were Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. See European Union,
The European Union at a Glance, at http://www.europa.eu.int/abc-en.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2002).
72. Bruce Barnard, EC Ministers Reject Pooling of Air Traffic Agreements, J. COM., Mar. 16,
1993, at 3B [hereinafter EC Ministers Reject Pooling].
73. See Michael Niejahr & Giuseppe Abbamonte, Liberalization Policy and State Aid in the Air
Transport Sector, EC COMPETITION POL'Y NEWSL. (European Community), Summer 1996, at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp1996024en.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2002).
For a complete discussion of E.C. aviation reform, see generally, Competition in the Air, supra note 1.
74. The Commission "embodies and upholds the general interest of the [Community]. The
President and Members of the Commission are appointed by the Member States after they have been
approved by the European Parliament." European Union, Institutions of the European Union, at
http://www.europa.eu.int/inst-en.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2002). The Commission: (1) has the right to
initiate draft legislation and present legislative proposals to the European Parliament and Council; (2) is
responsible for implementing the legislation (directives, regulations, decisions), budget and programs
adopted by Parliament and the Council; (3) acts as guardian of the treaties and, together with the Court
of Justice, ensures that [Community] law is properly applied; and (4) represents the [Community] on
the international stage and negotiates intemational agreements, such as in trade. See id.
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over the negotiation of bilaterals on behalf of the Member States.75
At a meeting of the Member States' transport ministers in March 1993, the
Commission requested that the Member States pool their bilaterals and grant
negotiating powers for future bilaterals to the Commission based on its earlier
successful completion of a multilateral agreement with Sweden, Norway, and
Switzerland to bring their regulations into conformity with the Third Package.76
While at least one national representative suggested that joint negotiations would
be to the Member States' advantage, another claimed bilaterals were
"sacrosanct." 77  The transport ministers ultimately rejected the Commission's
proposal, stating that they would only confer negotiating authority if they agreed
that the Commission would achieve better results than state-to-state negotiations.78
The Commission denied claims that it would bring suit against the Member States
over the matter.79
Less than a year later, bilaterals were once again placed in the spotlight of
scrutiny by the newly-renamed European Union,80 this time via the Comitd des
Sages (Comitd)8' in a report on international aviation. The Comitd observed that
most E.U.-based carriers relied on extra-European routes for half or more of their
activity.8 2 Consequently, bilaterals "have a substantial competitive impact" on the
intra-E.U. air transport market. 83 The Comitd argued that bilaterals "ignore the
new realities of the Single European Aviation Market" and should be replaced by a
multilateral regime under the European Union's control rather than the individual
Member States'.84 A strategy of negotiating external aviation agreements in
common would "dispel concerns about discriminatory treatment," while creating
increased potential for reciprocity on market access.8 5 In the Comitd's opinion
there was no debate about whether a multilateral negotiating framework should be
established, only how. 86  The report concluded by recommending that the
Commission be given appropriate negotiating powers before June 30, 1995.87
75. See EC Ministers Reject Pooling, supra note 72.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. The name change was effective January 1, 1994. See European Union, The History of the
European Union - 1993, at http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/history/1993/1993_en.htm (last visited Jan. 2 1,
2002).
81. Popularly called the "Committee of Wise Men" in English-language sources. See, e.g., Wise
Men: Bilaterals Ignore "New Realities" of Single Market, AVIATION DAILY, Feb. 17, 1994, at 7
[hereinafter Wise Men].
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id
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One Man Fights for the Future
The Commission's struggle for negotiating authority took a leap forward
when former British Labour Party leader"' Neil Kinnock became E.U. Transport
Commissioner in January 1995.89 Less than a month after taking office, Kinnock
was confronted with a report by the European Parliament accusing the
Commission of being "too timid" in the wake of the Comitd's findings and
engaging in activities that amounted to "little more than a consultation exercise."
90
Seemingly prompted by both the Parliament's harsh criticism and a sudden
renewal of interest by the United States in obtaining Open Skies bilaterals with
European nations,91 in March 1995 the Commission issued what Aviation Daily
characterized as a "strong.. .waming." 92 Member States were not permitted to
negotiate individual bilaterals, particularly with the United States and they could
be brought before the European Court of Justice if they pursued such a course of
action.93
The United States protested its innocence, arguing, "We have been trying to
negotiate an open skies deal for a long time. We have been pushing for
negotiations in a multilateral forum with the E.U."94  Meanwhile, six Member
States that had been approached by the United States for talks on Open Skies
bilaterals, 95 along with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, rejected a
proposal by Kinnock for granting the Commission the authority to negotiate a
88. See Joe Murphy, Anger at Euro-flag on Driving Licenses, MAIL ON SUNDAY (London), Jan.
15, 1995, at 15.
89. See Press Release, European Union, New Commission Portfolios Distributed and Working
Groups Set Up (Jan. 25, 1995), DN: IP/95/60, at http://www.europa.eu.int. It should also be noted that
in 1995 three new Member States were added to the European Union: Austria, Finland, and Sweden.
See European Union, The European Union at a Glance, at http://www.europa.eu.int/abc-en.htm (last
visited Jan. 21, 2002).
90. See Report To European Parliament Criticises 'Timid' Commission, AVIATION EUR., Feb. 16,
1995, at 1.
91. See EC Goal: All-Or-Nothing Bilaterals with US., AVIATION DAILY, Mar. 6, 1995, at 26
[hereinafter EC Goal]. U.S. Open Skies policy sprang back to life in 1992, with an announcement by
the Secretary of Transportation that the U.S. "will now offer to negotiate open skies agreements with all
European countries willing to permit U.S. carriers essentially free access to their markets." Defining
"Open Skies", Order Requesting Comments, 57 Fed. Reg. 19,323 (May 5, 1992). The U.S. completed
an Open Skies bilateral with the Netherlands almost immediately thereafter. See Warner, supra note 8,
at 300. This was followed by an announcement in 1994 that the U.S. intended to negotiate Open Skies
bilaterals with nine other European nations (three were non-E.U. Member States). See EC Goal, supra.
The Commission was probably particularly stung by a U.S. announcement in late February 1994 (i.e.,
after the Parliament's criticism of the Commission) that it would begin negotiations with Belgium, an
E.U. Member State. See id. U.S.-German bilateral negotiations, opened in October 1993, fell through.
Compare EC Goal, supra (noting that the United States was completing an Open Skies agreement with
Germany) with Caroline Southey, Kinnock Still Airborne Over Open Skies: Commissioner Ready for
Long Battle Over EU Airline Deals, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Mar. 24, 1995, at 2 (noting that
"Germany did not want to talk about open skies deals").
92. EC Goal, supra note 91.
93, See id.
94. See Southey, supra note 91.
95. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, and Sweden. Id.
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multilateral agreement.96 An unnamed aviation official told the Financial Times,
"Mr. Kinnock should have known he was going to be ignored by member states. If
he had been less gung-ho he would have stood a better chance of getting what he
wants. 97 An aide to Kinnock was equally blunt in rebuttal, "Doing something was
better than doing nothing .... [The Commission's] job is to protect the broader
interests of the [European Union]. That is just what he is doing., 98
In anticipation of the next E.U. transport ministers' meeting in late June,99
Kinnock stated that U.S. Open Skies negotiations "could put in peril the whole of
European deregulation."' lo Kinnock contrasted his "comprehensive, balanced
alternative" with U.S. efforts "to divide Europe in setting the ground rules for
civil-aviation relations."'' This was followed by a declaration that bilaterals were
"the most serious obstacle to competition,"'102 while a senior aide to the
Commission stated that the Commission was "duty bound under European law to
carry out infringement proceedings" against Member States negotiating new
bilaterals.10 3  Another Commission official added, "I am very concerned at the
cumulative effect of [bilaterals] on the [European Union's] interests."'104 Yet most
of the Member States were not so pessimistic and the transport ministers asked the
Commission to refine its proposals, which had been hastily formulated in the wake
of the U.S. Open Skies offensive. 10 5 Meanwhile, the Commission began to quietly
advance possible legal action against the more recalcitrant Member States that
were already negotiating (or had even signed) Open Skies bilaterals with the
United States.'16
Thus the transport ministers were somewhat suspicious at their meeting the
following year, although Kinnock approached the matter more optimistically by
claiming "considerable progress" on the subject of shifting negotiating powers to
the Commission.' 07 Despite initial sharp opposition from France and Britain, 08 the
transport ministers did agree on a draft mandate for conferring negotiating powers
to the Commission, 109 but the Commission paid a high cost for obtaining them.
96. See Southey, supra note 91.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See Julian Moxon, EC Sets Open-Skies Schedule, FLIGHT INT'L, June 14, 1995 [hereinafter
Open-Skies Schedule].
100. See Julian Moxon, US/EU Tensions Build Up Over Open Skies, FLIGHT INT'L, June 7, 1995
[hereinafter US/EU Tensions].
101. See id.
102. See Open-Skies Schedule, supra note 99.
103. See id.
104. Kinnock Pursues Air Deals to Thwart US Agreements, TRADE TRAVEL GAZETTE UK &
IRELAND, Apr. 5, 1995, at 16.
105. Julian Moxon, EC Moves Nearer to Open Skies, FLIGHT INT'L, June 28, 1995 [hereinafter EC
Moves Nearer].
106. See US/EU Tensions, supra note 100; EC Moves Nearer, supra note 105.
107. See France Rejects Traffic Rights as Issue in Multilateral Talks, AVIATION DAILY, Mar. 14,
1996, at 1.
108. See id.
109. Press Release, European Union, European Union Approves Commission Mandate to Negotiate
a Common Aviation Area with the United States (June 17, 1996), No. 35/96, at
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The Member States demanded that the Commission conduct negotiations in two
phases, the first phase would concern "soft issues," such as computer reservation
systems, slot allocation, l l0 ground handling, and air carrier ownership, while the
second phase would deal with "hard issues," such as traffic rights and pricing."'
The Commission would not be permitted to negotiate agreements on the "hard
issues" unless it could demonstrate "substantial results in the first phase."'"12
Finally, the Member States kept the right to negotiate their own bilaterals with
other nations."1
3
While the Commission declared the concessions represented a "true victory,"
the U.S. government said that it rejected limited negotiations, arguing that "soft"
and "hard" issues were "inextricably linked." ' 14 Yet even with U.S. criticism,
Kinnock felt enough had been obtained to be generous with the Member States,
announcing there would be "no roll-back on any bilateral agreement in existence or
under negotiation."'" 5 The Commission's complaint against Member States who
had signed bilaterals was thus effectively "defused."
'
"
6
However, by late 1997 the Commission's patience with the Member States
was growing short again as Member States continued to independently negotiate
bilaterals. 1' At the October E.U. transport ministers' meeting, Kinnock vowed
there would be a role for the Member States in Commission-led negotiations, yet
his aides suggested that legal action might be reinitiated against Member States
that had completed new bilaterals." 8 But despite what one commentator called
Kinnock's "nice guy/nasty guy routine," 119 the transport ministers would not be
swayed and again rejected granting the Commission full negotiating powers. 120
This led Kinnock to acknowledge that the Member States were "resistant" to
turning over negotiations to the Commission, but he promised to return to the issue
at the next transport ministers' meeting.
12
'
Frustrated by the continued intransigence of the Member States, in March
1998 the Commission announced that it would open legal proceedings against
seven Member States that had signed Open Skies bilaterals with the United States
http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/1996-2/pr35-96 (last visited Dec. 31,2001).
110. A "slot" is the right to take-off and land a single aircraft per day. PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY &
LAURENCE E. GESELL,. AIRLINE MANAGEMENT: STRATEGIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 252 (1997)
[hereinafter AIRLINE MANAGEMENT].
11. See Commission's Multilateralism Mandate Comes in Phases, May be Too Late, AVIATION
DAILY, June 20, 1996, at 1.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See Chris Johnstone, Brussels Cajoles and Threatens in Bid for United EU Air Front, J. OF
CoM., Oct. 8, 1997, at 20A.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See European Union Denies Kinnock Authority to Negotiate 'Hard Issues' With U.S.,
AVIATION DAILY, Oct. 10, 1997, at 63.
121. See id.
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and against the United Kingdom, which, with the United States, had amended
Bermuda 11.122 In its press release, the Commission said that it was "not motivated
simply by the legal breach of E.U. rules," but it acted because the bilaterals "do not
safeguard the long-term interests of the European air transport industry."' 123 By
giving access to national markets on different terms, the Commission argued that
bilaterals "not only distort the competition between airlines but also between
airports."' 24 Despite the Commission's careful phrasing, its frustration with the
Member States was still apparent, "Member States are not only failing to comply
with E.U. law, but are also not co-operating to adopt, within a reasonable time, an
E.U. approach making it possible to remedy the legal infringements and ensure
equivalent regulatory conditions .... A public statement by Kinnock's official
spokesperson was even more astonishingly blunt, "The cozy negotiations are over
and the gloves have now been taken off. If this does rattle some governments - so
be it.'
' 26
The Member States did not respond well to the Commission's threats, with
Britain and France declaring the following day that they would continue
negotiating with the United States regardless. 127 The German transport minister
characterized the threat as "unacceptable" and warned that it would "endanger
European jobs," while others called it "counterproductive."'' 28 Portugal and Italy
proceeded with their talks with the United States, 129 apparently unconcerned with
claims by "top EC officials" that such behavior was "a shortsighted policy based
on nationality."1 30 Yet Kinnock still offered that the Member States had a "final
chance" at the October 1998 transport ministers' meeting to give the Commission
full negotiating powers. 131
Ignoring the Commission's pleas and threats, the transport ministers once
more refused the Commission's request. 32 This prompted the Commission to step
up its actions against the Member States by reopening legal proceedings. 33 As
part of announcing the move, Kinnock conceded that the Member States had given
122. The Member States that had signed bilaterals were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Luxembourg, and Sweden. See Press Release, European Union, European Commission
Takes Legal Action Against EU Member States' "Open Skies" Agreements with the United States
(Mar. 11, 1998), No. 16/1998, at http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/1998-1/pr16-98 (last visited Dec.
31, 2001).
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See Chris Johnstone, Kinnock Challenges Open-Skies Pact, J. of Com., Mar. 12, 1998, at 12A.
127. See id.
128. See Kevin O'Toole, Open Skies Hostility, FLIGHT INT'L, Mar. 25, 1998, at 28.
129. See Lois Jones, Caught in the Loop, AIRLINE BUS., June 1998, at 24.
130. See Pierre Sparaco, European Deregulation Still Lacks Substance, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., Nov. 9, 1998, at 53.
131. See Bruce Barnard, Virgin Set to Challenge US Carriers in US Skies, J. OF COM., Sept. 24,
1998, at I IA.
132. See Chris Kjelgaard, Commission Takes Eight EU Nations to Court Over US Bilaterals, AIR
TRANSP. INTELLIGENCE, Oct. 30, 1998.
133. See id.
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the Commission negotiating powers, "[b]ut its scope is not broad enough to make
meaningful negotiation possible and until that changes, the Commission... has no
option but to pursue legal action."'134 He continued to explain that the Commission
"sees no other option but to pursue the procedure... to the finish."' 135  But
Kinnock continued to hold out the possibility of reconciliation, stating that the
Commission was "willing and available to constructively build a common
approach as regards air transport relations... and hopes that substantial
progress... will be made in the coming months."'
136
The Member States were seemingly less than impressed with the
Commission's offer of cooperation, as the United Kingdom continued its
negotiations with the United States, albeit at a significantly reduced rate, 137 while
just weeks after the Commission renewed its legal action, Italy declared that it had
completed an Open Skies bilateral with the United States. 38  The Commission
responded by opening legal proceedings against the Netherlands over its bilateral
with the United States. 139 This was a shock to the Member States, as the
Commission had previously indicated the Netherlands/U.S. bilateral would not be
challenged since it predated the Third Package. 140  However, what would be
perhaps the greatest shock was yet to come.
On May 12, 1999, Kinnock gave a speech to the European Aviation Club
entitled European Air Transport Policy: All Our Tomorrows or "All Our
Yesterdays" Replayed?14 1  Kinnock admitted European air transportation was
"shaping up to the future," but he cautioned "that restructuring in [the] industry
will only be truly successful if it is accompanied and strengthened by an effective
and proactive external strategy."' 14 2 He then sharply criticized the Member States
for continuing to negotiate bilaterals, referring to the "magical attraction" of
bilaterals and stating, "Nostalgia, it seems, still has a big future. Oxymoronism
rules."' 143  Yet what at first appeared to have been little more than another
opportunity for Kinnock to go after his opponents quickly became something
more. 144 It was here that Kinnock explicitly developed the concept of the TCAA
(referred to as the Common Aviation Area in most of the speech), a plan that he
134. See Kjelgaard, supra note 132.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See John D. Morrocco, Open Skies Impasse Shifts Alliance Plans, AVIATION. WK. & SPACE
TECH., Nov. 9, 1998, at45.
138. See U.S., Italy Agree to Open Skies, Pending Alitalia-Northwest Immunity, AVIATION DAILY,
Nov. 13, 1998 at 275.
139. See Netherlands/US Bilateral Agreement Focus of EC Proceedings, AIRLINE INDUSTRY INFO.,
Feb. 8, 1999.
140. See id.
141. Commissioner N eil Kinnock, European Air Transport Policy: All Our Tomorrows or "All Our
Yesterdays" Replayed (May 12, 1999) (transcript available at
http:leuropa-eu.int/comm/transportlglobal/speeches/990512.htm) [hereinafter All Our Tomorrows].
The title is a reference to a line in Shakespeare's Macbeth. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See generally id.
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had first suggested shortly after assuming the office of Transport Commissioner
but which had lain dormant during the confrontations with the Member States. 45
The TCAA would not simply be an E.U.-wide bilateral, but would be qualitatively
different, embracing a number of issues usually not found in bilaterals, such as
consumer rights and environmental protections, as well as traditional matters like
traffic rights and code-sharing. 46 Ironically, once Kinnock had finally devised a
coherent, albeit sketchy, means of implementing the Commission's goals for
external aviation policy, the Commission was reorganized and Kinnock removed
as Transport Commissioner. 1
47
His Truth is Marching On...
The new Transport Commissioner, Loyola de Palacio, seemed less interested
in the subject of bilaterals and the TCAA, 48 with leadership on the subject of the
TCAA passing largely into the hands of the Association of European Airlines
(AEA) 149 and its members. 50  Thus, at a 1999 global aviation summit with 90
participating nations, although de Palacio presented the concept of the TCAA, it
was the officers of several European carriers who spoke most forcefully on its
behalf.15' The chairman of British Midland Airways expressed dismay that the
United States and United Kingdom, both long-time champions of deregulation,
were opposed to multilateral agreements.15 2 Lufthansa's CEO argued the TCAA
was "the only way to make some progress" on the liberalization of international
aviation. 5 3 The president of KLM announced that bilateralism was dead and the
air transport industry would be "like a movie industry doomed by its governments
to produce only silent movies" if the TCAA, or some other form of multilateral
145. See Simon Warburton, Kinnock Calls Again for Common Transatlantic Pact, AIR TRANSp.
INTELLIGENCE, May 13, 1999.
146. See All Our Tomorrows, supra note 141.
147. See De Palacio is Proposed to Take Over As European Transport Commissioner, ATC
MARKET REP., July 22, 1999 at 8.
148. De Palacio's focus was centered on internal European air transportation issues, particularly air
traffic control See New EU Transport Commissioner Pledges to Fight for 'Single Sky', AVIATION
DAILY, Aug. 31, 1999, at 1. In a speech given on October 19, 2000, de Palacio restated, "IT]he
development of a Single Sky currently ranks amongst my over-riding priorities." See Commissioner
Loyola de Palacio, Europe's Future Aviation Policy, Address to the General Assembly of the European
Cockpit Association (Oct 19,2000), in WORLD AIRPORT WK., Oct. 31, 2000.
149. The AEA is composed of air carriers (scheduled, chartered, and cargo) registered in, licensed
by and with their principal place of business in an European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) state
and which have been engaged in passenger or cargo air transport operations for at least three years. See
AEA, Criteria for Membership, at http://www.aea.be/SpotlightAEA/AEAmbrship.htm (last visited
Jan. 23, 2002). The AEA has twenty-eight members, including all major E.U. carriers. See AEA, AEA
Member Airlines, at http://www.aea.be/CompLogos/companycontent.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2002).
The ECAC includes all E.U. Member States. See ECAC, ECAC Member States, at httpJ/www.ecac-
eac.org/uklecac/ecac-memberstates.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2002).
150. See James Ott, Aviation Summit Yields EU Plan for Open Market, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., Dec. 13, 1999, at 43.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id.
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accord, was not adopted. 15 4
Despite these strong testimonials, the TCAA did not gain many supporters
among the assembled transport ministers and no reference to it was included in the
conference's final statement.' 55  Furthermore, while de Palacio suggested at the
conference that the European Union and United States could meet at six-month
intervals to prepare for full negotiations on the TCAA, 156 there has been little
action on the subject. 57 Thus de Palacio's goal of a TCAA conference by the
summer of 2002 was not met.158
The year 2000 was one in which the TCAA was much discussed by the
international aviation community, 59 but there was little progress on the subject, as
the United States continued to refuse negotiations until the Commission received a
full mandate from the Member States.' 60 Recognizing that something drastic had
to be done to advance the possibility of negotiations, the Commission pressed on
with its suit against the rebellious Member States.' 61 The day of confrontation was
May 8, 2001, on which the Commission presented its case against eight Member
States 62 before the European Court of Justice (Court of Justice). 163 A decision in
the case was predicted first by the end of July, 164 then by "November or
December," 16 5 and, seemingly in moment of despair, "before spring."'
66
While a full decision was not anticipated until the summer of 2002,167 the
154. See Ott, supra note 150, at 43.
155. See Freedom's Paths, supra note 15.
156. See Graeme Osbom & Karen Walker, Sans Frontiers?, AIRLINE Bus., Feb. 2000, at 34
[hereinafter Sans Frontiers].
157. See Colin Baker, French Push for TCAA, AIRLINE Bus., Dec. 2000, Briefing (noting only
"informal talks ... in recent months") [hereinafter French Push].
158. See Sans Frontiers, supra note 156.
159. See, e.g., Jeffery N. Shane, Foreign Ownership and Control of U.S. Airlines: Prospects for
Change, Remarks Before the 25th Annual FAA Aviation Forecast Conference (Mar. 7, 2000) (transcript
available at http://www.api.faa.gov/conference/procdoc2000/shane.pdf); AEA Secretary General Karl-
Heinz Neumeister, Old World, New World - Differing Perspectives and Changing Perspectives on the
Airline Industry, Address to the International Aviation Club Luncheon (Apr. 27, 2000) (transcript
available at http://www.iacwashington.org/neumeister42700.pdf); Graeme Osbom & Karen Walker,
Worlds Apart, AIRLINE Bus., July 2000, at 28 [hereinafter Worlds Apart].
160. See US, EU Open Aviation Market Would Require "Political Will, " EU Says, AVIATION
DAILY, May 12, 2000, at 3.
161. See Head of Air Transport Division, Directorate General for Energy and Transport, Frederik
Sorensen, Towards a Consensus View of the Future International Air Transport Regime, Panel
Discussion at 26th Annual FAA Commercial Aviation Forecast Conference (Mar. 13-14, 2001)
(transcript available at http://api.hq.faa.gov/conference/conference2OOl/proc2OOl/transcript.htm).
162. The Member States were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. See Robin Pomeroy, Open Skies Hearing, NATIONAL POST, May 8,
2001, at C10.
163. See European Court Decision on Multilateral Mandate Expected by Year's End, WORLD
AIRLINE NEWS, June 1, 2001 [hereinafter European Court Decision].
164. See Sorensen, supra note 161.
165. European Court Decision, supra note 163.
166. US.-UK. Discussions Could Lead to Open Skies Agreement This Year, WORLD AIRLINE
NEWS, July 6, 2001 [hereinafter US-UK. Discussions].
167. See David Morrow, EC Yet to Determine Extent of Open Skies Overhaul, AIR TRANSP.
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Commission was rewarded with an opinion favoring its stance from the Advocate
General of the Court of Justice on January 31, 2002.68 The opinion addressed
matters in all eight cases, and dealt with a number of procedural questions in
addition to the central issue, 69 however, the analysis here will focus only on the
substantive portion of the case as it relates to bilaterals.
170
The Commission leveled two complaints against the Member States, first that
the terms of seven Member States' bilaterals171 violated "the external competence"
of the European Union and its governing bodies; 172 and second that all eight
Member States' bilaterals infringed Article 52 of the E.C. Treaty. 73  Before
assessing the merits of the first complaint, the Advocate General examined the
grounds for finding that the European Union possessed external competence in the
matter.' 74 Although declining to find external competence under one theory, 17 the
Advocate General did find external competence under another, using a string of
earlier decisions that could be read to support such a finding. 176 The Advocate
General therefore concluded:
[T]he Member States may not under any circumstances conclude international
agreements, even if these are entirely consistent with the common rules, since any
steps taken outside the framework of the Community institutions would be
incompatible with the unity of the common market and the uniform application of
Community.... Not even the requirement to ensure the full and correct
application of Community law could justify unilateral action by Member
States .... If... the Community was unable.., to conclude such agreements
directly, it would then be necessary... for its institutions and the Member States
to cooperate with a view to enabling the latter to amend the existing agreements in
a manner consistent and in accordance with the Community's interest. 177
With this principle established, the Advocate General turned to the question
of whether the seven bilaterals were in violation of four particular E.U. regulations
INTELLIGENCE, Jan. 31, 2002 (noting that a final ruling "will follow in a few month's time").
168. See Kieran Daly, Court Strongly Supports EC Bilateral Case, AIR TRANSP. INTELLIGENCE,
Jan. 31, 2002.
169. See Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, Joined Cases C-466, 467, 468, 469, 471,472, 475,
& 476/98, Commission v. United Kingdom, at http://europa.eu.int (search for case C-466/98), Table of
Contents (last visited July 8, 2002) [hereinafter Opinion of Advocate General].
170. While the procedural aspects are essential to processing of the case, such matters as whether
the pre-litigation procedure was unduly prolonged (see id. at paras. 31-32) or if the Commission even
had the authority to bring the action (see id. at paras. 42-77) are tangential to the subject of the TCAA.
171. The United Kingdom's bilateral was excluded from this complaint Id. at para. 41.
172. See id. A violation of "external competence" occurs when a Member State enters into an
agreement that is within a subject area that is the exclusive domain of the European Union. See id. at
para. 20.
173. See id. at para. 118. It should be noted that the Opinion uses the original numbering of the
E.C. Treaty rather than the revised numbering. See id. at para. I (identifying the relevant original and
revised article numbers).
174. See id. at paras. 41-77.
175. See id. at para. 58.
176. See id. at paras. 63, 69-70.
177. See id. at paras. 71, 73, 74 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
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concerning aspects of aviation17 8 and whether the bilaterals distorted competition
in the internal E.U. aviation market. 79 (Five bilaterals 180 were also examined in
light of a fifth regulation.) 181
The Commission's first argument was that the inclusion of Fifth Freedom
rights in the bilaterals violated regulations both on the licensing of air carriers
(Regulation No. 2407/92) and access to intra-E.U. routes (Regulation No. 2408/92)
by permitting U.S. carriers to operate on intra-E.U. routes without being licensed
as E.U. carriers. 8 2 The Advocate General rejected this theory, 8 3 noting:
[TIhere is nothing in Regulation No. 2408/92 from which it may be inferred that it
also aims to regulate (still less to prohibit) the granting of traffic rights within the
Community to non-Community carriers .... The right of Member States to grant
access to routes within the Community to non-Community carriers is therefore not
in any way curtailed by Regulation 2408/92, nor indeed by Regulation No.
2407/92 .... 194
The Advocate General then considered the Commission's argument that the
bilaterals distorted competition, undermining the European Union's internal
market. 18 5 The Commission's claim, however, failed to explain "in a precise and
detailed manner what the alleged discrimination and distortions of competition
might be.. . .," according to the Advocate General, and could be dismissed for
failure to carry the burden of proof.'8 6  Additionally, the Commission's legal
reasoning itself was faulty:
[11n the absence of Community legislation goveming relations in a given area with
third countries, the disparities which could hypothetically result from the
conclusion of different international agreements by Member States in that area
and the economic consequences that might ensue for the internal market do not in
themselves suffice to preclude the right of Member States to enter into such
agreements.1
87
The third argument of the Commission was that provisions of the bilaterals
178. See Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 169, at paras. 81-104. The regulations
considered were Council Regulations 2407/92, 1992 O.J. (L 240) 1; 2408/92, 1992 O.J. (L 240) 8;
2409/92, 1992 O.J. (L 240) 15; and 2299/89, 1989 O.J. (L 220) 1. See id. at paras. 81, 89, 98. See also
Competition in the Air, supra note 1, at 1039-46, 1049-63, 1078-88 (discussing these and related
regulations in detail). For procedural reasons, a transitional agreement held by Germany between 1994
and 1996 was exempted from the case, but Germany's final agreement of 1996 was validly included in
the complaint See Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 169, at 39-40.
179. See id. at para. 85.
180. Those of Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, and Sweden. Id. at para. 105.
181. Regulation No. 95/93, 1993 O.J. (L 14) 1. See id. See also Competition in the Air, supra note
1, at 1063-69 (discussing this regulation and related measures in detail).
182. See id. at para. 81.
183. See id. at para. 84.
184. See id. at para. 82.
185. See id. at para. 85.
186. See id. at para. 86.
187. See id. at para. 87.
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which permitted non-E.U. carriers to set fares on Fifth Freedom routes within the
European Union were in violation of the regulation concerning airfares on intra-
E.U. routes (Regulation No. 2409/92)188 The Advocate General agreed with the
Commission on this count,' 89 finding that "Regulation No. 2409/92 indirectly but
unequivocally excludes the right for non-Community carriers" to set fares below
existing levels. 190 Some Member States protested that they made changes to their
bilaterals so as to accommodate Regulation No. 2409/92,19' but the Advocate
General directed them to his earlier finding that Member States could not act
unilaterally, even to avoid conflict with E.U. regulations, on matters that were
within the European Union's external competence.
192
The Commission's fourth argument was that the bilaterals were in violation of
an E.U.-established code of conduct for computer reservation systems (Regulation
No. 2299/89).' 9' The regulation stipulated that the operators of computer
reservation systems in non-E.U. states were subject to the principle of reciprocity
for their treatment of computer reservation systems in Member States. 94 The
Member States protested again that the provisions of their bilaterals concerning
computer reservation systems had been drafted so as to avoid conflict with the
regulation. 195 The Advocate General rebutted this contention by pointing out that
Regulation No. 2299/89 gave the European Union external competence and that
"Member States no longer had power to assume international obligations in that
area, even international obligations consistent with those provisions."' 96 Thus the
Advocate General found in the Commission's favor on this point as well.
19 7
Finally, the Commission alleged that five of the disputed bilaterals affected
slot allocation at E.U. airports (a procedure ordinarily covered by Regulation No.
95/93) by promising "fair and equal conditions of competition" for non-E.U.
carriers, which the Commission argued typically included slot allocation
measures.' 98 The Advocate General, however, agreed with the Member States that
the Commission had failed to prove the fair and equal competition provision had
any application to slot allocation.'" Furthermore, in most instances the offending
provision in the bilaterals antedated the European Union's regulation of slot
allocation procedures, so E.U. oversight would not apply even if the provision
impinged on the European Union's external competence..2° The Advocate General
188. See Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 169, at para. 89.
189. See id. at para. 97.
190. See id. at para. 91.
191. See id. at para. 95.
192. See id. at para 96 (citing para. 73).
193. See id. atp ara98.
194. See id.
195. See id. at paras. 99, 101.
196. See id. at para. 103.
197. See id. at para. 104.
198. See id. at para. 105.
199. See id. at para. 107.
200. See id.
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therefore found in the Member States' favor on this matter.20 1
Before issuing his final recommendation on the Commission's first complaint,
the Advocate General also addressed the Member States' main defense: that their
bilaterals should be entirely exempted from E.U. oversight.20 2 The Member States
claimed the first paragraph of Article 234 of the E.C. Treaty offered such an
exemption by providing that "[t]he rights and obligations arising from agreements
concluded before the entry into force of this Treaty between ... Member States...
and one or more third countries..., shall not be affected by the provisions of this
Treaty., 20 3  The Advocate General rejected both this argument and the
Commission's inverse theory that even provisions of the bilaterals preceding
adoption of E.U. regulations should be invalidated. 204 He explained, "while it is
true that the amendments in question did not completely transform the old
agreements into new ones, it is also the case that if they were incompatible with
Community law they could not be justified by reference to the continuance of the
old agreements into which they incorporated., 20 5 Therefore, the Advocate General
concluded in regards to the first complaint that the Member States were in
violation of the European Union's external competence in regards to Regulations
Nos. 2409/92 and 2299/89, in conjunction with Article 5 of the E.C. Treaty.20 6
The Commission's second complaint was directed against all eight defendants
and accused them of violating Article 52 of the E.C. Treaty.20 7 Article 52 prohibits
Member States from imposing discriminatory regulations against establishment of
businesses in their territories by the nationals of any other Member State.20 8 The
Commission's theory was that the Member States' bilaterals were in conflict with
Article 52 because of their inclusion of a nationality clause, which permitted the
parties to the bilateral to designate the air carriers they would allow on the routes
encompassed by the bilateral and deny those traffic rights to air carriers owned by
the nationals of a third-party state. 20 9 Therefore, the nationality clause would be
discriminatory since it expressly allows parties to the bilateral to treat a carrier
from another Member State differently than a carrier from the contracting Member
State.2'0 The defendant Member States parried by suggesting that if discrimination
201. See Opinion of Advocate General , supra note 169, at para. 108.
202. See id. at para. 109.
203. See id. (citing EC TREATY art. 234).
204. See id. at 111-12.
205. See id. at 112.
206. See id. at 117. That article of the E.C. Treaty reads:
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to
ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action
taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the
Community's tasks. They shall abstain from any measures which could jeopardise the
attainment of the objectives of this Treaty.
EC TREATY, art. 5.
207. See Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 169, at para. 118.
208. See EC TREATY art. 52. The term "establishment" includes founding and operating
businesses. See id.
209. See Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 169, at para. 118.
210. See id. at para. 120.
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resulted it would be the fault of the non-Member State (in this instance the United
States).2 1' This is because the nationality clause does not prevent the contracting
Member State from designating carriers from other Member States, it merely
allows the non-Member State to reject or limit the access of such carriers.21 2
The defendant Member States also argued that Article 52 would not be
applicable because the discriminatory activity would take place outside of the
European Union (i.e., on transatlantic routes).21 3 Furthermore, some defendants
suggested, Article 52 did not apply because of Article 84 of the E.C. Treaty.21 4 In
addition, Germany claimed that its bilateral had been amended to eliminate the
discriminatory effects of the nationality clause.21 5
The Advocate General stated that the Commission's interpretation of the
article was preferable, as it was evident that under the nationality clause the
defendant Member States were not according air carriers owned by other Member
States, or their nationals, the same treatment as carriers owned by the defendants
and the defendants' nationals.21 6 The defendant Member States could not blame
the United States, the Advocate General found, as the discrimination was inherent
in the nationality clause itself.
217
The Advocate General dealt tersely with the other objections to the
Commission's claim made by the Member States. 21 8  He pointed out that the
discriminatory conduct concerned the right of establishment, which did occur
within the confines of the European Union, thus the fact that the flights were
primarily outside of E.U. territory was irrelevant. 2 9 The Advocate General was
similarly unimpressed with the defendant Member States' attempt to rely on
Article 84, pointing out that the Commission's claim was made under the
establishment provisions of the E.C. Treaty, not the transportation provisions.220
Finally, the Advocate General reviewed Germany's amended bilateral nationality
clause, concluded that it still permitted discrimination against air carriers owned or
controlled by the nationals of other Member States, and therefore found that the
Commission's claim against Germany could go forward as well.221
Having found that the Commission's claim under Article 52 was valid, the
Advocate General turned to the defenses raised by the Member States.222 The first
defense offered was that the nationality clause would be permitted under Article 56
211. See Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 169, at para. 121.
212. See id.
213. See id. atpara. 122.
214. See id. at para. 122. Article 84 (2) specifically exempts sea and air transport from the general
provisions of Title IV (concerning transportation) of the E.C. Treaty, making them subject to it only
when the Council chooses so. See E.C. TREATY, art. 84 (2).
215. See Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 169, at para. 122.
216. See id. at para. 123.
217. See id.
218. See id. at paras. 124-26.
219. See id. at para. 124.
220. See id. at para. 125.
221. See id. at para. 126.
222. See id. at paras 127-140.
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of the E.C. Treaty, which allows Member States to retain laws and regulations that
have a discriminatory effect on foreign nationals for purposes of public policy,
security, or health.223 The Advocate General found this to be a weak argument,
pointing out that the bilaterals contained ample provisions for dealing with security
and other public policy concerns besides the nationality clause.224 Additionally,
the nationality clause is not limited to use where there is an "actual threat to a
public-policy interest," but can be applied for protectionist purposes, which is not a
permissible act under Article 56 according to earlier Court of Justice decisions.225
However, even if this was not the case, the Advocate General believed that the
nationality clause would be in violation of Article 52, as "Article 56 cannot
[justify] derogating measures adopted by Member States where the protection of
the public interest.. . can be secured by less restrictive means. 226 The Advocate
General suggested that the nationality clause would be permissible if drafted so as
to give all E.U. carriers equal access but to still permit the United States to exclude
non-E.U. carriers. 227 However, as written, the nationality clause was not protected
by Article 56.228
The other defense offered by the Member States was that their bilaterals were
protected by the first paragraph of Article 234 of the E.C. Treaty, which allowed
Member States to retain agreements established prior to their accession to the
European Community or Union and that their Open Skies bilaterals were simply an
extension of earlier bilaterals with the United States.229 The Advocate General first
considered the merits of this defense in regards to Belgium and Luxembourg,
concluding that it did not apply, as they completed basic bilaterals containing the
nationality clause after their accession to the European Community, so the question
of subsequent modification was not relevant.230 Next, the Advocate General
examined the situation of Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, and Sweden, all of
which had in fact completed basic bilaterals with the United States prior to
becoming subject to the E.C. Treaty, and which had not amended their nationality
223. See Opinion of Advocate General , supra note 169, at para. 127. The first clause of Article 56
states, "The provisions of this Chapter and measures taken in pursuance thereof shall not prejudice the
applicability of provisions laid down by law, regulation, or administrative action providing for special
treatment for foreign nationals on grounds of public policy, public security, or public health." EC
TREATY, art. 56 (1).
224. See Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 169, at para. 128.
225. See id. (citing Case 352/85, Bond van Adverteerders v. Netherlands, 1988 E.C.R. 2085, para-
34).
226. See id. at para. 129 (citing Case C-1 14/97, Commission v. Spain, 1998 E.C.R. 1-6717, para.
47).
227. See id. at para. 130. The Advocate General noted that the defendant Member States claimed
that they had proposed amendments of that sort to their bilaterals, but that the United States gave a "flat
refusal" to such changes. See id.
228. See id. at para. 132.
229. See id. at para. 133. The first paragraph of Article 234 states "[t]he rights and obligations
arising from agreements concluded before 1 January 1958 or, for acceding States, before the date of
their accession, between one or more Member States on the one hand and one or more third countries
on the other, shall not be affected by the provisions of this Treaty." EC TREATY, at art. 234.
230. See Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 169, at para. 134.
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clauses in subsequent Open Skies bilaterals. 23' The Advocate General agreed with
those five defendants that the nationality clauses in their bilaterals predated their
accession, but "while it is true that in the formal sense the clause was not amended
by [their Open Skies] agreements . . , it is also the case that, following their
conclusion, the content of the clause has none the less been profoundly altered. 232
The Advocate General found that the scope of the nationality clause was
extended as a byproduct of the amendments that created Open Skies bilaterals
between those defendant Member States and the United States.233 Open Skies
bilaterals gave rise to this situation by granting full Fifth Freedom rights to U.S.
carriers, thus "the parties implicitly agreed to extend the scope of the clause in
question, by modifying the rights and obligations flowing from it."'234 Therefore,
while the text of the nationality clause had remained unchanged, the Member
States had, in effect, amended it by permitting substantial increases in traffic on
affected routes and the nationality clause could not be saved by appealing to the
first paragraph of Article 234.2
Finally, the Advocate General examined the situation of the United Kingdom,
which had signed Bermuda I with the United States prior to joining the European
Community, but had subsequently adopted Bermuda 11.236 Unlike the previous
Member States' bilaterals, which were created by amending earlier agreements, the
Advocate General found that when the United States and United Kingdom entered
into Bermuda II a new agreement was created.237 The Advocate General therefore
concluded, "By virtue of this new manifestation of intention, there is no doubt that
the clause in question was incorporated into Bermuda II: in other words, into an
agreement which was concluded after the Member State's accession to the
Community."238 With this established, the Advocate General thus found that none
of the nationality clauses in question enjoyed protection under the first paragraph
of Article 234.239
Before summarizing his findings and his conclusion, the Advocate General
240
also turned to an alternative complaint offered by the Commission. The
Commission asked that, in the event the Court of Justice found that the first
paragraph of Article 234 did, in fact, protect the nationality clauses of Austria,
Denmark, Finland, Germany, and Sweden, the Court of Justice consider whether
the nationality clauses infringed the second paragraph of Article 234.241 The
second paragraph of the article requires Member States to remove any
231. See Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 169, at paras. 134-38.
232. See id. at para. 136.
233. See id. at para. 138.
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. See id. at para. 139.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See id. at para. 140.
240. See id. at para. 141.
241. See id. at para. 142.
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incompatibilities between a prior agreement and provisions of the E.C. Treaty."'
The Advocate General noted, "that the Court has recently given quite a strict
interpretation of that provision.... Member States have even [had] to go so far as
denouncing such agreements if the contracting third [-party] states do not intend to
renegotiate them. 243 While the defendant Member States claimed they asked the
United States to renegotiate the nationality clause, the Advocate General rejected
that as inadequate. 2 " Instead, "the Member States concerned must show that they
made every effort to remove the incompatibility; and it does not seem to me
that... they did so" as required by the second paragraph of Article 234.245
Therefore, in the cases of those five Member States, the Commission's alternative
complaint would also succeed.246
The Advocate General's final recommendation to the Court of Justice was to
find that all defendant Member States had violated Article 52 of the E.C. Treaty by
the inclusion of nationality clauses in their bilaterals. 247 The Advocate General
also determined that seven defendants (the United Kingdom excluded), should
further be found to have violated regulations concerning fare setting and computer
reservation systems by including certain provisions in their bilaterals. 248 Finally,
the Commission's alternative complaint should be upheld against five of the
defendant Member States.249
As this article was going to press, the Court of Justice found in favor of the
Commission.250 The final text of the Court's decision is not available yet, but
preliminary reports indicate that the opinion follows the outline of the AdvocateGeneral's Opinion.251 Loyola de Palacio hailed the Court's ruling, saying,
"Today's judgment is a major step towards developing a new coherent and
dynamic European policy for international aviation .... From now on, it is clear
from the Court's ruling that we will all have to work together in Europe to identify
and pursue our objectives jointly. 25 2 The Commission observed that under the
242. See Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 169., at para. 142. The full text of the second
paragraph reads: "To the extent that such agreements are not compatible with this Treaty, the Member
State or States concerned shall take all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities established.
Member States shall, where necessary, assist each other to this end and shall, where appropriate, adopt a
common attitude." EC TREATY, art. 234.
243. See Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 169, at para. 143 (citing Joined Cases C-62/98
& C-84/98, Commission v. Portugal, 2000 E.C.R. 1-5171).
244. See id. at para. 144.
245. See id.
246. See id. at para. 145.
247. See id. at para. 150.
248. See id.
249. See id.
250. EU Court Rules Against "Open Skies" Accords With US, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 5,
2002 [hereinafter EU Court Rules Against "Open Skies "].
251. See Press Release, European Court of Justice, The Court of Justice Explains, by These
Judgments, the Distribution of Competence as Regards the Conclusion of International Air Transport
Agreements (Nov. 5, 2002), No. 89/02, available at http://curia.eu.int/en/cp/afflcp0289en.htm (last
visited Nov. 5, 2002).
252. Press Release, European Union, Open Sky Agreements: Commission Welcomes European
Court of Justice Ruling (Nov. 5, 2002), No. IP/02/1609, available at http://www.europa.eu.int/
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terms of the Court's ruling, "Member States may no longer make commitments to
other countries on [aviation] matters. Member States that conclude bilateral deals
risk creating conflicts in between their commitments at [the] international level and
their obligations under EC law." 253 To avoid these conflicts, the Commission
stated there was an "urgent need" for negotiations on the TCAA and promised to
issue a communication in the near future that would further articulate its position
on the subject.254
PART II: FACE OF THE FUTURE
With the Commission victorious in the Court of Justice, the question
becomes, what would the TCAA look like?
Birth of a Notion
Although not referred to as the TCAA, or any of its other commonly used
names, the first guide to what form the TCAA could take was delivered by the
Comitd in 1994.255 The Comitd offered eleven specific recommendations for a
"common external policy" on aviation to be adopted by the European Union's
Council of Ministers (Council).256 The Comitd suggested that the Council should
develop a liberal aviation policy to "send a clear signal to non-European States and
air carriers that E.U. external aviation policy will be consistent and will encourage
reciprocal growth and expansion of services." 257 The system would be phased in
over several years, "but with a clearly defined timetable," and use the leverage of
the "whole European market" to its advantage. 25' The system would establish
uniform regulations for computer reservation systems and promote cooperation on
the use of competition laws.259 Carriers licensed by Member States would be
given "non-discriminatory opportunities" to engage in Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh
Freedom flights from any point in the European Union to extra-E.U.
destinations. 260 Limits on ownership, control, and investment by foreign nationals
would be lifted on a reciprocal basis.261 A single authority would be established to
allocate traffic rights and carrier designations in a fair and transparent manner.262
The policy would make allowances for the limits of infrastructure and regional
comm/energytransport/mm-dg/newsletter/n1026-2002-11-08_en.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2002)
[hereinafter Open Sky Agreements].
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See Wise Men, supra note 81.
256. See Recommendations from the report by the Comitd des Sages for Air Transport to the
European Commission (Jan. 1994) [hereinafter Recommendations], in 2 EUROPEAN AIR LAW [E ] 1.3
- 1, 9-10 (Elmar Giemulla et al. eds., 1992 & Supp. June 1994).
257. See id. at 9.
258. See id.
259. See id. at 9-10.
260. See id. at 10.
261. See id.
262. See id.
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development, while permitting E.U.-based carriers "to restructure as global
competitors., 263 Finally, "all existing traffic rights," with non-Member States, i.e.,
bilaterals, should be preserved, at least to the extent they "benefit... all
Community carriers. 26
The Scottish Play
In his speech All Our Tomorrows or "All Our Yesterdays" Replayed?,
Kinnock did not reference the Comit's recommendations of five years earlier.265
However, traces of those earlier recommendations can be seen running through
Kinnock's account of what the TCAA would entail. The TCAA, in Kinnock's
view, "would not simply include the standard exchange of rights under
conventional 'open skies' deals.,, 266 The TCAA would include "essential issues
beyond traffic rights," for the purpose of "securing change at the core of the
restrictive bilateral system - the prevailing rules on ownership and control. 267
Regulatory matters concerning computer reservation systems, "code-sharing, slots
management and trading, state aid, bankruptcy protection, leasing, and dispute
settlement" would also be a part of the TCAA.268  Kinnock considered
harmonization of competition laws to be a "major issue" in the TCAA because it
263. See Recommendations, supra note 256, at 10.
264. See id.
265. See generally All Our Tomorrows, supra note 141.
266. Id. Assuming that Kinnock was referring to the model Open Skies bilateral used by the U.S.,
a "conventional" Open Skies bilateral includes:
1. Open entry on all routes;
2. Unrestricted capacity and frequency on all routes;
3. Unrestricted route and traffic rights (includes the right to operate service between any point in the
U.S. and any point in the European country, including no restrictions as to intermediate and beyond
points, change of gauge, routing flexibility, coterminalization, or the right to carry Fifth Freedom
traffic);
4. Double-disapproval pricing in Third and Fourth Freedom markets and (1) in intra-E.U. markets: price
matching rights in third-country markets, (2) in extra-E.U. markets: price leadership in third-country
markets to the extent that the Third and Fourth Freedom carriers in those markets have it;
5. Liberal charter arrangement (the least restrictive charter regulations of the two governments would
apply, regardless of the origin of the flight);
6. Liberal cargo regime;
7. Conversion and remittance arrangement (carriers would be able to convert earnings and remit in hard
currency promptly and without restriction);
8. Open code-sharing opportunities;
9. Self-handling provisions (right of a carrier to perfonr/control its airport functions that support its
operations);
10. Procompetitive provisions on commercial opportunities, user charges, fair competition and
intermodal rights; and
11. Explicit commitment for nondiscriminatory operation of and access for computer reservation
systems.
See In the matter of defining "Open Skies", Department of Transportation, Order 92-8-13, August 5,
1992, available at 1992 DOT Av. LEXIS 568, at 14-16.
267. See All Our Tomorrows, supra note 141.
268. See id.
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would create a situation that would facilitate industry consolidation. 269 Kinnock
concluded by arguing that transnational convergence of regulation on safety,
security, environmental matters, and customer service was necessary as well. 70
Perhaps the most significant difference apparent between the Comitd's
recommendations and Kinnock's proposal was Kinnock's complete omission of
any possibility for a remnant of the existing bilateral regime to survive in the
TCAA.27 1
Diogenes Speaks
In September 1999, the AEA released a policy statement entitled Towards a
Transatlantic Common Aviation Area.272  Although the AEA is a private
273
organization, its vision of the TCAA appears to have become the prevailing
one. 274 The AEA's policy statement is not cast as a comprehensive guide to the
establishment of the TCAA, noting that its establishment "need not and should not
be delayed until each and every detail of regulatory convergence has been
settled., 275  However, "it is essential to define the basic principles, the overall
structure, and the initial level of convergence that should apply at the outset."
276
Significantly, the AEA envisions the TCAA as simply an "essential first step"
towards a "new, modem regulatory framework for international air transport",277
that will be "suitable for gradual application worldwide. '278 To achieve this, "it
will be necessary to create a single set of aviation rules under which European and
U.S. air carriers would operate. 279
The AEA explained the goal of the TCAA as follows:
269. See All Our Tomorrows, supra note 141.
270. See id.
271. See generally id. This is understandable, however, given that Kinnock called the continuing
existence of bilaterals, "[Tihe continuation of narrow and short-term policy stances which prevent or
inhibit advances in the general and - crucially - the individual interest of Member States and the E.U.
aviation industry." See id.
272. AssOcIATION OF EUROPEAN AIRLINES, TOWARDS A TRANSATLANTIC COMMON AvIATION
AREA (1999) [hereinafter TOWARDS A TCAA], available at
http://www.aviationtoday.comreportstaeapolicystatement.pdf.
273. See COMMuSSION ON AIR TRANSPORT, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE NEED
FOR GREATER LIBERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT (2000), at
http://www.iccwbo.org/home/statements-rues/statements/2000/need-for-greater-]iberalization.asp
(last visited Jan. 25, 2002).
274. The Vice-President of Government and Legal Affairs for KLM characterized the AEA's
version of the TCAA as "the basis for negotiations" between the European Union and United States.
See FAA Predicts Golden Future for Aviation, But Offers Some Caveats, WORLD AIRLINE NEWS, Mar.
10, 2000. The AEA itself is more modest, however, noting in the policy statement itself, "The purpose
of the present paper is to clarify what the AEA airlines believe are key aspects and elements of the
TCAA .... The paper lays no claim to be complete or to have identified in each area the only or best
possible solution." TOWARDS A TCAA, supra note 272, at 16-17.
275. See TOWARDS A TCAA, supra note 272, at 1-2.
276. Id. at 2.
277. Id. at 1.
278. Id. at 3.
279. Id. at 4.
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The concept of a TCAA is intrinsically different from that underlying
conventional aviation bilaterals. The latter are based on independent action by
two sovereign authorities and the continuance of separate policies and separate
powers. The creation of a TCAA is of course itself the result of negotiation
between sovereign authorities; but the objective is gradually to reduce the
differences and to achieve unified policies and rules .... Moreover, unlike a
conventional air agreement, the establishment of a TCAA is necessarily a dynamic
on-going process since regulatory standards continue to evolve over time .... In
particular, it is essential that the parties to the TCAA can agree and implement
changes in their own rules as required for convergence purposes. This means that
the agreement establishing the TCAA should be in the form of a treaty, so that it
would override national rules that are inconsistent with its provisions.
Four principal subjects for the TCAA to initially focus on were identified by
the AEA:
1. Rules governing market entry and access, pricing and selling/purchase of air
transport;
2. Rules governing airline ownership and the right of establishment;
3. Rules governing airline competitive behavior and co-operative arrangements;
and
4. Rules governing the use of leased aircraft.28'
On the first subject, the AEA argued that all carriers of TCAA signatories
should have "unrestricted commercial opportunities" to fly to any point within the
TCAA.2 s2 In the absence of any countervailing "competition enforcement action,"
carriers would be given the right to choose their routes, set capacity, and set
fares.28 3 Discriminatory public procurements would be barred and air cargo
services would be fully liberalized, including in the fields of intermodal transport
and indirect services.284 As for extra-TCAA routes, those would remain covered
by existing bilaterals between the individual TCAA signatories and the third-party
nation, however all TCAA carriers would enjoy access on the same terms of the
bilateral for flights originating in the TCAA signatory. 8 5 This avoids giving
carriers based in different signatories "dissimilar opportunities" in operations to
216third-party nations.
With the second subject, ownership and establishment, the AEA confronted
280. TOWARDS A TCAA, supra note 272, at 5.
281. Id. at 6.
282. See id. at 7.
283. See id. at 8.
284. See id.
285. See id. This would be the case if, say, the United States and France were both TCAA
signatories and both had separate bilaterals with Japan, which was not a TCAA signatory. A U.S.
carrier flying from New York to Tokyo would operate subject to the U.S.-Japanese bilateral, as under
the current system. However, a U.S. carrier flying from Paris to Tokyo would operate subject to the
French-Japanese bilateral.
286. See ToWARDs A TCAA, supra note 272, at 8.
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"one of the core elements of the traditional international air transport regulatory
system., 287 The TCAA should "permit cross-border mergers, acquisitions, and
new entry. '288 Failure to grant such rights "would run counter to the basic
objectives of the TCAA," while their inclusion "would help to balance out natural
disparities in market opportunities" by permitting carriers to migrate to where
"sufficient opportunities are available." 289  While recognizing that there are
multiple possible bases for defining a TCAA carrier, the AEA recommended
defining them as carriers which "are majority owned/controlled by nationals of the
[signatories) or their respective governments.,, 290 The AEA conceded that third-
party nations might object to such freedoms, however it was of the opinion that the
risk was minimal, particularly since the ICAO had come out in support of
liberalizing ownership/control requirements.291 The TCAA should collectively
seek resolutions to objections by third parties on this subject, although if that fails
then the interests of carriers based in the individual TCAA signatory involved in
the dispute would take priority.
292
The third subject, competition policy, presented "one of the most important,
and difficult, aspects of the TCAA. 293 The AEA observed that "the parameters
used and the procedures followed to determine anti-competitive behavior are of
major importance for the airline industry," because in a liberalized system "the
enforcement of competition standards becomes the principal means of regulatory
control. 294  Consequently, the AEA argued that the TCAA should produce
common standards in:
1. Basic criteria for granting antitrust exemptions;
2. The definition of "relevant market" for examining anticompetitive behavior;
3. The concept of "market power" versus "market share";
4. The concept of "predatory" behavior;
5. The issue of what "essential facilities" carriers would be obliged to share;
287. See TOWARDS A TCAA, supra note 272, at 8.
288. Id.
289. See id. at 8-9.
290. See id. at 9.
291. See id. at 9-10. The following year, the president of the ICAO reiterated his support for such
changes, "In my view, the evolution of ownership and control provisions on a global basis would be a
key economic regulatory development towards ensuring the safe, secure and orderly growth of civil
aviation.... It would bring our industry in line with others and produce substantial economic benefits."
See Worlds Apart, supra note 159.
292. See TOWARDS A TCAA, supra note 272, at 10.
293. See id. For more detailed examination of U.S. and E.U. antitrust and competition law, see
generally Brian Peck, Comment, Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws and the US.-E. U
Dispute Over the Boeing and McDonnell Douglas Merger: From Comity to Conflict? An Argument for
a Binding International Agreement on Antitrust Enforcement and Dispute Resolution, 35 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1163 (1998); Amy Ann Karpel, Comment, The European Commission's Decision on the
Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger and the Need for Greater US.-E. U Cooperation in the Merger
Field, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1029 (1998).
294. See TOWARDS A TCAA, supra note 272, at 10.
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6. The treatment of carrier alliances; and
7. The nature of punishments and remedies that could be applied.
295
The AEA allowed that a convergence of policies on such matters "cannot be
achieved overnight," but "substantive discussions" between E.U. and U.S. officials
would be vital.29 The AEA claimed the mere extension of existing competition
procedures could not be contemplated.297 Instead, it argued, "The very concept of
the TCAA and the major importance for the airline industry of harmonised
competition policy in such a common area mean that it is not enough for the E.U.
and the U.S. to agree simply to co-operate in the application of their two sets of
rules. 298  The AEA was of the opinion that the most important areas for
convergence of competition policies were those concerning strategic alliances, and
other restructuring arrangements, along with code sharing, franchising, and related
agreements.29
On the final subject, the leasing of aircraft, the AEA considered the current
regulations of both the European Union and the United States to be "unduly
restrictive," making it all but impossible for a domestic carrier to "wet lease"
30°
aircraft from foreign carriers.30 1 The AEA argued, "Essentially, safety should be
the only legitimate concern with respect to the use of leased aircraft by TCAA-
based airlines for operations within the TCAA. 3 °2 The only other restriction the
AEA would be willing to admit on this matter would be a reasonable limit to the
percentage of a TCAA carrier's fleet that could be wet-leased from third-party
carriers, to avoid having those carriers circumvent access restrictions to the TCAA
market.30 3
Having established what it considered to be the most important areas for
preliminary negotiations, the AEA proceeded to set out a rough sketch of the
institutional structures that would be necessary for the TCAA's operation.
Three principal "mechanisms" would be required, one for the adoption of common
regulations, one for the uniform application of those regulations, and one for
dispute resolution under those regulations. 0 5 The former two functions would be
combined into one body.306 The AEA proposed that this body would be composed
of individuals nominated by the TCAA signatories, but empowered with "a degree
of independence," which would report to a joint committee of the signatories.30 7
295. See TowARDs A TCAA, supra note 272, at 11.
296. See id.
297. See id. at 11-12.
298. See id. at 12.
299. See id.
300. A "wet lease" is a lease for an aircraft and a crew as a unit, as opposed to a "dry lease," which
is a lease for an aircraft only. See AIRLINE MANAGEMENT, supra note I 10, at 421.
301. See TOWARDS A TCAA, supra note 272, at 12.
302. Id. at 13.
303. See id.
304. See id. at 13-15.
305. See id. at 13.
306. See id.
307. See id. at 14.
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The new body would "ensure effective commonality in the application of the
agreed rules and a dynamic development of the TCAA by refining the common
rules and developing an authoritative body of precedents... and by working out
detailed proposals for new rules and modifications of the existing ones.
30 8
The AEA noted that dispute resolution procedures in existing bilaterals leave
much to be desired.3°  Indeed, because the procedures are so faulty, or even
nonexistent, the disputing nations often resort to unilateral measures, which can
lead to an escalating spiral of retaliation.310 To avoid this, the AEA has proposed a
two-phase system of dispute resolution for the TCAA. 31 1 The first phase would
require parties to negotiate for a fixed period of time, with a mediator if necessary,
in an effort to reach a mutually acceptable solution.1 2 In the event that the parties
were unable to reach a solution, the matter would move to phase two, which would
be a type of formal adjudication.3 13 The rulings of the adjudicatory body should be
binding on the parties, possibly through a mechanism similar to the WTO's, where,
if the bad actor does not pay compensation or otherwise comply with the ruling,
the winning party is entitled to impose sanctions equal to its losses.
3 14
The AEA recognized, based on the different bilaterals and regulatory
environments existing among the potential signatories, there were several different
categories of transition that would be necessary to implement the TCAA.1 5
However, the AEA declined to set out transition guidelines, arguing that it is the
transition qua transition that is important rather than procedural details.316 Indeed,
the AEA stated, "The modalities of transition should therefore essentially be left to
be negotiated by the E.U. Member States in question, without burdensome
preconditions other than some basic minimum requirements." 317 Regardless of the
"modalities," the duration of the transition should be held to a reasonable period
and the transition should be done on a reciprocal basis between the signatories to
prevent discrimination against carriers. 3'8  Finally, the AEA cautions that these
proposals are not "a set of independent entries on an 'A la carte' list of proposals,"
but instead must be handled as a unified work.319
Interestingly, although de Palacio has used almost all of the AEA's proposals
308. See TOWARDS A TCAA, supra note 272, at 14.
309. See id. A recent example of this son of problem is a dispute between El Salvador and the
United States over alleged predatory pricing and "capacity dumping," i.e., excessive empty space on
flights, by Continental Airlines. The U.S.-EI Salvador bilateral has no provision for an enforcement
mechanism, nor does Salvadoran law. Consequently, El Salvador's major carrier, Grupo TACA, may
be forced to sue in U.S. courts under U.S. antitrust laws. See David Knibb, Play by the Rules, AiRLINE
Bus., Apr. 2000, at 72.
310. See TOWARDS A TCAA, supra note 272, at 15.
311. See id.
312. See id.
313. See id.
314. See id.
315. See id. at 15-16.
316. See id. at l6.
317. Id.
318. See id.
319. See id. at 17.
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in her own speeches on the TCAA subsequent to the publication of the policy
statement, 320 the AEA rejected two of the Commission's main tactics in attempting
to establish the TCAA. The AEA argued that existing bilaterals and bilateral
negotiations "should remain unimpaired" during the transition to the TCAA and
that the Commission should halt its legal action against the Member States because
it is "inconsistent with the objective of creating a new framework for E.U.-U.S. air
services and detrimental to Community trade interests. 321 With the Commission's
case against the Member States having received a favorable opinion from the
Advocate General and now awaiting the Court of Justice's decision,322 it appears
unlikely that the Commission will adopt those recommendations.
PART III: THE TCAA AND THE DEADLY SINS
The inevitable question now arises, "Why hasn't the TCAA been adopted?"
Although the Commission has employed a veritable scorched earth policy against
the Member States, almost all of them support the TCAA, at least in principle.32s
Only the United Kingdom and Ireland are flatly opposed to the TCAA,324 while
even France, long a holdout, has been warming to the idea.325 In a twist worthy of
0. Henry, most opposition to the TCAA is now found in the United States,
326
although there are pockets of resistance remaining in Europe as well. 327 Once a
U.S. official could claim, "We have been pushing for negotiations in a multilateral
forum with the E.U.,,328  Yet more recently a commentator has observed,
"International aviation policy has stalled as [the U.S. Department of
Transportation] and Congress let labor unions' knee-jerk opposition and
unimaginative airlines imprison them in a time warp. The U.S. long ago lost its
desire for big changes. 329  Upon hearing about the liberalization of foreign
ownership limits by New Zealand, one U.S. government official lamented, "New
Zealand, like the Dutch, sings our song better than we do.
330
320. See, e.g., Beyond Open Skies, supra note 2.
321. See TOWARDS A TCAA, supra note 272, at cover letter.
322. See Dunn, supra note 254.
323. See Pomeroy, supra note 162, at CIO.
324. See id. The United Kingdom may be softening its position on the TCAA as well. Recently,
the head of international aviation policy for the U.K. Civil Aviation Authority stated, "The TCAA is the
only way of delivering full liberalisation on the North Atlantic." See Mark Pilling, Only a CallAway,
AIRLINE Bus., Mar. 2001, at 38.
325. See French Push, supra note 157.
326. See Joan M. Feldman, Holes in the Dike: Market Forces Dissatisfied with Star Alliance, AIR
TRANSPORT WORLD, Aug. 1, 2000, at 43 [hereinafter Holes in the Dike].
327. See, e.g., Assistant General Secretary, European Transport Workers' Federation, Brenda
O'Brien, International Air Services Agreements: The Concerns of Workers, Address to the French Civil
Aviation Authority (DGAC) Conference (Mar. 27, 2001), at http://www.itf.org.uk/ETF/e 14080 l.htm.
328. Southey, supra note 91.
329. Joan M. Feldman, Drip, Drip, Drip, AIR TRANSPORT WORLD, Mar. 1, 2001, at 42 [hereinafter
Drip].
330. See id.
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Sloth...
As indicated above, at least part of the responsibility for progress on the
TCAA grinding to a halt can be laid on the lack of excitement for the proposal on
the part of U.S. carriers.331 An industry observer stated, "The [U.S.] carriers won't
derail an ownership/control change but they won't lead the charge. 332 Indeed,
U.S. carriers almost flaunt their apathy, with such industry figures as Will Ris, the
Vice-President of Government Affairs for American Airlines, openly remarking
that the carriers "don't spend a lot of time thinking" about the TCAA or related
matters, and that the emphasis is "gaming the current system. 333
Northwest Airlines' Vice-President of International and Regulatory Affairs,
David Mishkin, offered, "We are in favor of [the TCAA], but when it comes I'm
not so sure. 334 CEO of Continental, Gordon Bethune, has said that the United
States should liberalize its restrictions on ownership, but not to the extent
suggested by the AEA's proposal.335 Delta Airlines is somewhat more supportive;
its general manager for finance and planning on Atlantic routes having stated that
there is "no need to keep things off the table. Let true competition exist.
' 36
However, he added that he did not see "foreign carriers flocking to take advantage
of cabotage rights. 337  Herb Kelleher, CEO of Southwest Airlines, offered a
similar mixed response to the possibility of cabotage, "I don't think it will ever
happen. It does not make any difference to Southwest one way or another ....
But if they want to do that, it's fine with me."'338 Among the major U.S. passenger
carriers, only United Airlines appears eager about the possibility, Shelley
Longmuir, its Senior Vice-President of International and Regulatory Affairs having
recently made the enthusiastic, if grim, statement that "[United] is ready to
compete. Our customers are demanding it. We want to see progress because in
the coming world one will either acquire or be acquired.,
339
Cargo carriers, such as Federal Express, UPS and DHL, are more enthusiastic
about the idea of further liberalizing international aviation. 340  However, their
concern seems to be that the TCAA does not do enough to reduce barriers to
international aviation.341 Federal Express' Vice-President for Regulatory Affairs
has complained that the TCAA as proposed is "too narrow" because of its failure
33 1. See Drip, supra note 329, at 42.
332. Holes in the Dike, supra note 326, at 43.
333. See id.
334. European Carriers Favor TCAA; Americans are More Cautious, AVIATION DAILY, May 16,
2000, at 5.
335. See Holes in the Dike, supra note 326, at 43.
336. See Colin Baker, US and UK Remain Apart on Open Skies, AIRLINE BUS., Dec. 2000, at 19.
337. See id.
338. See Kevin O'Toole & Karen Walker, The King of Low-Cost, AIRLINE Bus., June 1999, at 38.
339. See Senior Vice-President, International and Regulatory Affairs, Shelley Longmuir, Towards a
Consensus View of the Future International Air Transport Regime, Panel Discussion at 26th Annual
FAA Commercial Aviation Forecast Conference (Mar. 13-14, 2001) (transcript available at
http://api.hq.faa.gov/conference/conference200i/proc200l/transcript.htm).
340. See Cargo Will Drive Removal of Trade Barriers, AVIATION DAILY, May 15, 2000, at 6.
341. See id.
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to include adequate discussion of ground-handling and related issues.342 UPS has
indicated that it would want uniform noise and environmental regulations included
in the TCAA to ensure that traffic rights granted under the agreement would be
"fully usable." 343 Thus, while the major cargo carriers find the current bilateral
regime overly restrictive, 344 they are not united on what should replace it.
345
Avarice...
Unlike the U.S. carriers, which "don't spend a lot of time thinking" about the
TCAA, 34 labor unions, both in the United States and European Union, have
considered the significance of the TCAA and similar measures.347 Duane Woerth,
President of the U.S.-based Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), has stated, "Can a
TCAA happen without labor support? Probably not., 348  Soon thereafter, an
ALPA spokesman added, in regards to the TCAA, "There has to be a system for
employees to have a regulatory framework for their working lives .... What
labour laws apply to [a wet-leased] aircraft and crew? '349 At the same event, the
General Secretary of the European Cockpit Association, Giancarlo Crivellaro,
commented that the TCAA should "not be left.., entirely to market forces," and it
should have "a managing economic framework. 3
5 0
Yet labor unions do not appear to be irrevocably opposed to the general
concept of the TCAA, simply to the TCAA as proposed by the AEA. 35 1 As Brenda
O'Brien, Assistant General Secretary for the European Transport Workers'
Federation explained:
But how can International Air Services Agreements, such as the TCAA, guarantee
[the unions' interests]? In their current form, they simply do not. Architects of
such agreements might be well-advised to listen to those who work in the
industry: our checklist.., is utterly feasible and introduces necessary safeguards
that ultimately benefit the industry, consumers, and employees.
352
Woerth has also recently commented, "ALPA does not object to
342. See Cargo Will Drive Removal of Trade Barriers, supra note 340, at 6.
343. See id.
344. See Jo Pearse & Karen Walker, Transport Ministers From Around the World Joined Airline
and Industry Chiefs in Chicago in December to Discuss how to Shed the Bilateralism Legacy of the
Historic 1944 Chicago Convention and Also Move Beyond the Current Open Skies Regime to
Multilateralism, AIRLINE BUS., Jan. 2000, at 28.
345. See Holes in the Dike, supra note 326, at 43.
346. See id.
347. See Labor Participation Key to TCAA Development, Union Leaders Say, AVIATION DAILY,
May 15, 2000, at 2 [hereinafter Labor Participation].
348. Simon Warburton, ALPA Calls for More TCAA Scrutiny, AIR TRANSPORT INTELLIGENCE,
May 12, 2000.
349. Simon Warburton, Virgin Expresses Irritation at US Status Quo, AIR TRANSPORT
INTELLIGENCE, May 12, 2000.
350. See Labor Participation, supra note 347.
351. See O'Brien, supra note 327; US.-U.K. Discussions, supra note 165.
352. O'Brien, supra note 327.
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multilateralism. '353 However, he qualified this statement by noting that ALPA was
still opposed to cabotage, changes in foreign ownership requirements, and other
key elements of the AEA's version of the TCAA.354 Therefore, while not
absolutely barring the TCAA, it appears that union opposition will be a key
stumbling block in any effort to negotiate using the current proposal.355
And Wrath
Cabotage,356 and all but a scintilla of foreign ownership of U.S. carriers, are
prohibited under U.S. law,3 57 but are essential to any of the proposed versions of
the TCAA. 358 Although this has often been accounted for as protectionism for the
benefit of U.S. carriers;359 that appears to be an inadequate explanation in light of
the apathetic view of the matter taken by most U.S. carriers. 36 0 In fact, the greatest
obstacles to the TCAA are elements of the U.S. government itself.
36
'
At an aviation symposium in 1999, the Assistant Deputy Undersecretary for
the Department of Defense darkly intoned, "As we explore airline ownership
issues, we must keep U.S. national security foremost in our minds. 362 This is
keeping in character with explicit U.S. national security policy since 1987, when a
directive on "national airlift policy" was issued, which concluded, "United States
aviation policy, both international and domestic, shall be designed to strengthen
the nation's airlift capability and where appropriate promote the global position of
the United States aviation industry. 363 The primary reason given for this position
is the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF).3 4 Under the CRAF program, U.S. carriers
353. U.S.-UK Discussions, supra note 166.
354. See id.
355. See id. Early last year, a multilateral agreement between the United States, Brunei, Chile,
Singapore, and New Zealand was nearly sunk by provisions that were inserted at the behest of U.S.
labor unions. See Charles J. Simpson, Jr., Guest Editorial, AVNEWS LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN,
Feb. 2001, athttp://www.zsrlaw.comlpublications/articles/cjsOlO3.htm. Therefore, another of Woerth's
comments about the TCAA, to the effect that, "If you don't deal with labor's issues, your plan will be
dead on arrival," should not be viewed as an idle threat. See Labor Participation, supra note 347.
356. See 49 U.S.C. § 41703(c) (2001) (permitting cabotage only in the case of emergency, under 49
U.S.C. § 40109(g)).
357. To qualify as a domestic carrier, an airline must be owned, directly or indirectly, by a U.S.
citizen. See 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(2) (2001). A U.S. "citizen" is an individual person who is a citizen
of the United States, a partnership where all partners are citizens of the United States, or a corporation
chartered in the United States, in which at least seventy-five percent of the voting shares are controlled
by U.S. citizens, and the president and at least two-thirds of the board of directors and other managing
officers are U.S. citizens. See 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(15) (2001).
358. See generally Recommendations, supra note 256; All Our Tomorrows, supra note 141;
TOWARDS A TCAA, supra note 271.
359. See, e.g., Schless, supra note 10, at 456.
360. See Holes in the Dike, supra note 326, at 43.
361. See Karen Walker, US DOD Gives Red Light to Ownership Changes, AIRLINE Bus., June 1,
1999, at II [hereinafter Red Light].
362. See id.
363. See Nat'l Sec. Decision Directive No. 280 (June 24, 1987), at http://www.acq.osd.miU
log/tp/trans_progransldefensetrans-library/airpolicy/airpolicy.html (last visited July 8, 2002).
364. See id.
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voluntarily supply aircraft to the U.S. military to greatly increase its airlift
capacity.365 The program has been used once in over fifty years and that was in a
situation where U.S. national security was not imminently jeopardized. 36
However, the Department of Defense insists that U.S. security interests would be
endangered if foreign citizens were allowed to own greater portions of U.S.
carriers because "[d]uring times of crisis we need to know without question there
is support. 367 Although some foreign carriers have attempted to assuage the U.S.
military's concerns by offering to make their own aircraft available for the CRAF
program, the Department of Defense has been dismissive of such proposals.368
369The CRAF program is generally justified in terms of national security. But
when the importance of the program is discussed in detail, the question appears to
be more one of cost to the U.S. military than security.370 Indeed, a U.S. Air Force
captain has even directly stated, "the value of the CRAF is the cost that the DOD
has avoided by relying on the capability of the commercial aviation industry to
maintain [the required transport capacity]."37' The cost of purchasing an
equivalent amount of air capacity would be fifty billion dollars and maintenance
costs of one to three billion dollars a year thereafter.372 Yet this assumes the U.S.
military must replace the entire CRAF program capacity. 373 Given that during the
1990-91 Gulf War two-thirds of the aircraft in the CRAF program were deployed
at most,374 and that the CRAF has not been activated since the attacks of
365. See Freedom's Paths, supra note 15, at 74. See also USAF Fact Sheet: Civil Reserve Air
Fleet, at http://www.af.mil/news/factsheets/CivilReserveAirFleet.htm (last updated May 1999)
[hereinafter USAF Fact Sheet]. The CRAF program was authorized by section 101 of the Defense
Production Act of 1950, now 50 U.S.C. Appx. § 2071. See 10 U.S.C. § 9511(6) (2002).
366. See Cross-border Investment, supra note 3 (noting that the CRAF has only been deployed
once, for the 1990-91 Gulf War).
367. See RedLight, supra note 361, at 11.
368. See Foreign Ownership Issue Divides Panelists at Aviation Symposium, AVIATION DAILY,
May 5, 1999, at 212.
369. See, e.g., USAF Fact Sheet, supra note 365.
370. See, e.g., William G. PaImby, Enhancement of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet: An Alternative for
Bridging the Airlift Gap, 7-8, 26, 53 (June 1995), at
http://www.Maxwell.af.miVau/saas/studrsch/palmby.doc; Pamela S. Donovan, The Value of the Civil
Reserve Air Fleet: How Much Could the DOD Spend on Incentives?, 32-34, 41-48 (Sept. 1996) at
http://papers.maxwell.afmil/projects/ay1996/afit/donov_ps.pdf; Strategic Airlift and Sealift Imperatives
for the 21st Century: Hearing Before the Senate Armed Services Seapower Subcommittee, 107th Cong.
(statement of Gen. Charles T. Robertson, U.S.A.F. Commander-in-Chief United States Transportation
Command), available at 2001 WL 2007359 [hereinafter Robertson Testimony].
371. See Donovan, supra note 370, at 32.
372. See Robertson Testimony, supra note 370.
373. See id.
374. See Palmby, supra note 370, at 8, 53-54 (noting that the CRAF is activated in three stages,
totaling 80, 238, and 379 at each stage, and that during the Gulf War the third stage aircraft were not
activated.) It should also be noted that second stage cargo aircraft were not activated until after
hostilities began and the second stage passenger aircraft were only activated on March 23, 1991, for the
purpose of withdrawing U.S. troops after the conflict. See Donovan, supra note 370, at 18. Thus it
appears that little more than a fifth of the CRAF fleet was used during the build-up to the actual
conflict. Cf PaImby, supra note 370, at 8 (noting that the first stage consisted of 80 aircraft and the
maximum number of aircraft was 379).
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September 11, 200 1,37 this appears excessive. The U.S. military's position also
does not consider the costs to the U.S. aviation industry of denying it needed
capital376 and costs to consumers by limiting air service.
37 7
CONCLUSION
"Open Skies is not good enough 56 years after [the Chicago] Conference,"
declared Frederik Sorensen a few months prior to his retirement from his position
as the head of the European Union's air transport section. 378  And after years of
struggle, most of Europe seems to agree, both in government
379 and industry. 380
Yet the United States, once the champion of international liberalization,381 is now
"practically on the sidelines. 38 2 With the decision of the Court of Justice freshly
rendered, and the Commission yet to fully come to grips with its new authority, 8
it remains to be seen whether the TCAA will become the defining institution of a
new multilateral regime in aviation agreements. There is still the possibility that
one of the other embryonic proposals for a multilateral system will prevail.
384
Regardless of the final outcome, it is evident that the notion of the TCAA or a
similar transatlantic multilateral has been decisive in shaping U.S.-E.U. aviation
relations over the past decade. Even if the TCAA is stillborn, the bilateral regime
will never be the same.
375. See Richard Thompson & Bloomberg News, FedEx Joins Effort to Help Military Keep
Materials Flowing, CoM. APPEAL (Memphis), Oct. 10, 2001, at C2. See also Mathew Schwartz, Let's
Make a Deal Amid a Season of Uncertainly, Consumers and Retailers Play the Discounting Game,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 28, 2001, at F6 (noting that activation was a "remote possibility"); John Hughes,
American, FedEx, 31 Carriers Commit Planes for War, BLOOMBERO NEWS, Oct. 15, 2002 (noting that
even in the event of a second war with Iraq "only a fraction" or "none at all" of the CRAF would be
needed).
376. See Press Release, Continental Airlines, Continental Airlines Chairman Calls for Relaxed
Foreign Ownership Rules as Airline Industry Faces Global Consolidation (June 19, 2000), at
http://www.continental.com/press/press_2000-06-19-01 .asp.
377. See Friedman, supra note 3, at 136.
378. See Holes in the Dike, supra note 326, at 43.
379. See Pomeroy, supra note 162, at C 10.
380. See Ott, supra note 150.
381. See Drip, supra note 329, at 42.
382. See Holes in the Dike, supra note 326, at 43.
383. See Open Skies Agreements, supra note 252.
384. See, e.g., Abeyratne, supra note 4, at 832-856 (discussing GATS or the WTO as alternatives).
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